Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1983

Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest
Gene R. Shreve
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, shreve@indiana.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory
Commons

Recommended Citation
Shreve, Gene R., "Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest" (1983). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 986.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/986

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Federal Injunctions and the
Public Interest

Gene R. Shreve*

In 1937, the Supreme Court observed, "Courts of equity may, and
frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when
only private interests are involved."' The point has been restated so
often by federal courts that it has become an aphorism. 2 Commentators and courts have attempted to ascribe various truths to the idea,
asserting that it means equitable discretion is virtually limitless, and
therefore the advancement of public policy is easily accommodated
within courts' power to grant injunctions; 3 or that equity doctrine restricting the availability of injunctions should not be permitted to
block realization of public-policy goals; 4 or that a federal court can
forebear from the issuance of an injunction warranted under equity
doctrine on grounds of public policy.5 This Article asserts that these
Copyright © 1983 by Gene R. Shreve.
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; A.B. 1965, University of
Oklahoma; L.L.B. 1968, L.L.M. 1975, Harvard Law School.
The author wishes to acknowledge the research suggestions of Wythe Holt and the
assistance of Maurice J. Holland, Peter Raven-Hansen, Richard H. Seeburger, and
Roger Trangsrud, who read and made helpful comments on the manuscript. Any aspects of the Article which trouble the reader are, of course, attributable solely to the
author. The research assistance of Frank N. Olmstead, Vermont Law School Class of
1982, and Billie Grey, National Law Center Class of 1983, is also gratefully
acknowledged.
1. Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
2. See, e.g., Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 179-80 (1973); Porter
v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 441
(1944).
3. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 97-159 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 160-76 and accompanying text.
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attempts are misguided.
Part I of this Article undertakes a limited restatement, reformation,
and defense of some of the ideas used to limit federal equitable discretion. From its English Chancery origins, injunction decision making has been based on ideas of equitable discretion, and the bulk of
equity doctrine has been devoted to rules restraining the exercise of
that discretion. Traditionally, core elements of equitable restraint
have been gathered under the rubric: "equitable jurisdiction." This
Article rejects the prevailing view that the restraints of equity should
be discarded. Instead, the author offers a theory of equitable jurisdiction that, it will be argued, has potential for illuminating and, in
appropriate cases, averting potential burdens on the principals in the
injunction proceeding, and strains on the judicial process. Not only
can each element of equitable jurisdiction be seen as having its own
resonance and utility, in addition, the elements can be combined to
form a decisional framework facilitating principled, closely reasoned
decisions granting or denying injunctions. The author concludes that,
thus viewed, equity doctrine can be brought into the developing
mainstream of procedural jurisprudence: the contemporary shift
from the formalistic to the instrumental, from rule to method.
Part II probes application of the author's theory of equitable jurisdiction to the sphere of federal litigation in which the resilience and
growth of equity doctrine faces its strongest challenge: cases affecting the public interest. Discussion in this section provides opportunities both to elaborate and test the author's theory and to use the
theory as an instrument for evaluating the soundness of equity decisions made in the face of public-interest arguments. To consider
whether equity should go further than the limits of equitable jurisdiction would suggest in order to advance public policy, part II examines Hecht Co. v. Bowles 6 and related cases, in which Congress may
have attempted to abbreviate the federal courts' equitable jurisdiction inquiry. To consider whether equity should go further to withhold relief in the name of public policy, part II examines Younger v.
Harris7 and similar cases, in which injunctions against state statutes
challenged as unconstitutional were denied in the name of federalism. The Article concludes that, properly understood, doctrines of equitable jurisdiction are capable of accommodating many important
public-policy concerns, and that the further, unstructured use of public policy to overturn the result of a properly conducted equitablejurisdiction inquiry promotes injustice and distorts equity doctrine.
6. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
7. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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L
A.

A Theory of Equitable Jurisdiction

Nature and Origins of Federal Equity Power

Article III of the United States Constitution extends the federal judicial power to cases "in Law and Equity."8 Federal trial courts have
been empowered to grant equitable relief since the Judiciary Act of
1789. 9 In exercising this power, federal courts have adopted doctrines
of judicial restraint developed in the English Chancery Court.1 0 The
sum of these doctrines, termed "equity jurisdiction" by Justice
Story," is today exercised by state 12 as well as federal' 3 courts.
8. U.S. CONST. art. M, § 2. The provision was considered at the Constitutional
Convention. After one objection to the "vesting of these powers in the same Court," it
passed by a vote of six yes, two no, and three absent. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 428 (1937).
9. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.20, §§ 1-35, 1 Stat. 73-93 (1789). For reviews of the legislative history of the development of equity in the Act, see G. McDoWELL, EQUITY AND
THE CONSTITUTION 44-47 (1982), and Von Moschzisker, Equity Jurisdictionin the Federal Courts, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1927).
Section 16 of the Judiciary Act required that federal equity power not be exercised
"where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law." Scholars have suggested that Congress imposed this restriction in lieu of making federal equity suits
subject, as federal law actions were, to the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(1976). P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPImO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 729 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART
& WECHSLER]. This view appears correct: when Congress repealed the restriction in
1948, it simultaneously made federal equity proceedings subject to the Rules of Decision Act.
10. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945); G. McDOWELL, supra
note 9, at 47; Morse, The Substantive Equity HistoricallyApplied by the United States
Courts, 54 DICK. L. REV. 10 (1949); Developments in the Law -Injunctions, 78 HARv. L.
REV. 994, 997 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Developments - Injunctions].
Earliest equity decision making was diffused throughout the English legal system.
By the fourteenth century, it had evolved into a separate system, which remained isolated from English law practice until the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 abolished the
Chancery and merged law and equity. These and other developments in English equity practice are discussed at length in Hazeltine, The Early History of English Equity,
in ESSAYS m LEGAL HISTORY 261-85 (P. Vinogradoff ed. 1913); 5 W. HOLDswORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 336-38 (1924); F. MArLAND, EQUITY 1-16 (2d rev. ed. 1936); and
Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L REV. 87 (1916). English equity was
shaped in substantial part by the intellects and imaginations of the strongest figures
who attained the office of Chancellor. For proffiles of the most important, see T.
PLUNKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 695-707 (1956).
11. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 68 (1972).

12. Although state courts today have developed extensive equity jurisprudence,
see, e.g., State ex. rel. Turner v. United-Buckingham Freight Lines, Inc., 211 N.W.2d.
288, 290 (Iowa 1973), "in 1789 equity was either non-existent or undeveloped in the
courts of many of the states." HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 664; see also L. FRIEDMAN, A ISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 130-131 (1973) (states without a developed equity
system often allowed litigants to make equitable claims in cases "at law"). This may
explain why federal equity courts were not required by statute to conform their practice to state practice, as were the federal law courts. See C. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CODE PLEADING 32-33 (1947). Instead, the product of the Supreme Court's first
exercise of its rulemaking power, the Equity Rules of 1822, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v, governed equity practice in the federal courts. HART &WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 665. For
a thorough discussion of the Rules as applied by the federal courts, see Lane, Federal
Equity Rules, 35 HARv. L. REV. 276 (1922). The federal equity rules lost effect in 1938,
when Congress merged federal law and equity practice in enacting the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 21-22 (2d ed. 1977).
These rules now govern all equity cases in federal courts. FED. R. CrV. P. 1. On the
effect of the Federal Rules on prior equity practice, see Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal
Rights and Remedies under the New Federal Procedure, 31 CALIF. L REv. 127 (1943)
(observing that the new rules abolished only the procedural distinctions between law
and equity, without affecting differences in rights, remedies, and substantive rules).
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Historically, equitable jurisdiction required a party seeking equitable relief to meet a different and frequently more onerous burden of
justification than that required to secure a legal remedy. Because
courts used their discretion in granting equitable relief,14 the definition of equitable jurisdiction - that is, equitable power - quickly
became a survey of the principal rules limiting that discretion.
These limiting rules have gradually become most significant as applied to the modern equitable remedy, the injunction. 15 Three concerns of equitable restraint are central to every case in which an
injunction is sought. Petitioner must demonstrate that, without the
injunction, he would suffer harm that would be immediate, 16 substantial,' 7 and irreparable.' 8 In addition, concerns of injunction managea13. Use of the term "equitable jurisdiction" with respect to federal courts risks
creating confusion between equitable power and federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
Justice Holmes took pains to distinguish the two in Massachusetts State Grange v.
Benton, 272 U.S. 525 (1926). There the Court refused to authorize an injunction on the
grounds that it lacked equitable jurisdiction. Justice Holmes explained:
Courts sometimes say that there is no jurisdiction in equity when they
mean only that equity ought not to give the relief asked. In a strict sense the
Court in this case had jurisdiction. It had power to grant an injunction, and
if it had granted one its decree, although wrong, would not have been void.

Id. at 528. A similar distinction is attempted in D.
REMEDIES 62 (1973).

DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF

In operation, of course, the two doctrines are different. In addition, federal equitable
jurisdiction is derived from an older and broader tradition than is subject-matter jurisdiction, which is largely idiosyncratic to federal courts. Nonetheless, this Article suggests that the two do at times converge. See infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
The risk of confusion does not seem to have discouraged use of the term equitable
jurisdiction. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 40-41
(1959); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven,
320 U.S. 228, 236 (1943); Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943).
14. In the sixteenth century, St. Germain wrote that it was the "intent [of] equytie
... to temper and mitigate the rigour of the law." C. ST. GERMAIN, DIALOGUES BETWEEN
A DOCTOR OF Drvrnrry AND A STUDENT IN THE LAWs OF ENGLAND 45 (W. Muchall 18th ed.
1792); see also 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 10, at 281 (equity is necessary in order
that the law can do complete justice); G. McDowELL, supra note 9, at 15-18 (discussing
Aristotle's theories on the need for equity to lessen the severity of positive law). Justice Story observed: "In the most general sense, we are accustomed to call that Equity,
which, in human transactions, is founded in natural justice, in honesty and right...
1 J. STORY, supra note 11, at 1.
These justifications for equity offer little help in suggesting limits upon the use of
equitable power, and the prospect of abuse of equitable discretion has evoked hostility. Consider John Selden's famous remark that equity, "a rougish thing," depended
upon the length of the Chancellor's foot. H. McCrmTcOC, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQurrY 50 n.8 (2d ed. 1948). Several scholars have asserted that equity decision
making be confined by precedent. See F. MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 13; G. McDOWELL,
supra note 9, at 30-31, 43. Others have argued that to circumscribe equitable discretion
by proposing rules of general application would destroy equity's vitality and unique
contribution to the law. See Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, 23 TEX. L REV.
244, 249-50 (1945); Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLum. I REV. 20, 24 (1905).
15. Professor Maitland described the injunction as one of three remedies to evolve
from equity, the other two being specific performance and judicial administration of
estates. F. MAIrLAND, supra note 10, at 22. For early examples of possible uses of the
injunctive remedy, see id. at 318-19, and 2 J. STORY, supra note 11, at 163-64.
16. See infra notes 52-64 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
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bility 9 play a role: courts should deny the injunction or restrict its
20
scope if serious difficulties in framing or enforcing the decree exist.
Other snares have awaited parties seeking equitable relief. Until recently, equity's protections were confined to property as opposed to
personal rights.2 ' Assorted maxims borrowed from English practice
for example, that petitioner must seek an equitable remedy with
clean hands or must not be tardy in seeking an injunction 22 - have
found their way into federal 23 and state 24 equity jurisprudence, as
has the invention of balancing the equities. 25 All of these notions
could be considered part of equity jurisdiction in the largest sense.
But the first four criteria - imminence, substantiality, irreparability,
and manageability - are most important and are perhaps the only
concerns consistently capable of sustaining the burden of justification that refusal to issue an injunction carries. These four shall provide the list of elements in the theory of equitable jurisdiction
26
developed in this Article.
B.

Equitable Jurisdiction Under Attack

An increasing number of scholars have asserted that the constraints
of equity jurisdiction have outlived whatever purposes they once
served and should therefore play a reduced part in a court's decision
to grant or deny an injunction. 27 Professor Fiss has advanced what is
perhaps the most formidable attack. He contends that the constraints
19. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
20. See Developments - Injunctions, supra note 10, at 1012-13; cf Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) ("The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the
power of the Chancellor... to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular

case.").
21. Several scholars have severely criticized the attempt to draw a line short of the
protection of personal rights. E.g. Pound, Equitable Relief Againt Defamation and Injuries to Personalty, 29 HAuv. L. REV. 640, 681-82 (1916); Zammit, Developments in the
Law of Equitable Remedies, 51 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 563, 564 (1979). The distinction has been
rejected in most jurisdictions. E.g., Maxwell v. Sutton, 621 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Ark. App.
1981); Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 534, 70 N.E.2d. 241, 244-45 (1946).
22. See generally H. McCLiNTOCK, supra note 14, at 59-60, 71-76 (discussing the development of the clean hands doctrine and the maxim that equity aids only the
vigilant).
23. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945) (denying equitable relief on a theory of unclean hands).
24. See Gorham v. Sayles, 23 R.I. 449, 453-54, 50 A. 848, 850 (1901) (denying equitable relief because of petitioner's delay in bringing suit).
25. SeeWelton v. 40 East Oak St. Building Corp., 70 F.2d 377, 381-83 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Welton, 293 U.S. 590 (1934); Golden
Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 125-29, 235 P.2d 592, 594-96 (1951). See generally
Keeton & Morris, Notes on "Balancing the Equities," 18 TEX. L. REV. 412 (1940);
Mechem, The Peasantin His Cottage: Some Comments on the Relative Hardship Doctrine in Equity, 28 So. CAL. L. REv. 139 (1955).
26. For different attempts to assign an order of importance to elements of equitable discretion, see Winner, The Chancellor'sFoot and Environmental Law: A Callfor
Better Reasoned Decisions on Environmental Injunctions, 9 ENvTL. LAw 477, 499 (1979)
(advocating an expanded role for the balancing of equities in injunction decision making), and W. DEFuNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQurry 10 (1956) (observing that the
requirements of no adequate remedy at law and substantial harm are the two main
prerequisites to equitable jurisdiction).
27. See 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 6 (1978); Hammond, Interlocutory
Injunctions: Timefor a New Model, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 240, 272-73 (1980); Laycock, Injunctions and The IrreparableInjury Rule (Book Review), 57 TEx. L REv. 1065, 1067
(1979); Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisitefor an Injunction, 33
U. FiA. L. REV. 346, 347-48 (1981).
[VOL.
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of equitable jurisdiction have placed the injunction in an inferior position within the hierarchy of remedies, as it is much easier for plaintiffs to obtain a legal remedy, such as damages, than it is to obtain an
injunction. 28 He argues that this subordination of the injunction to
damages is unjustified; the decision as to which remedy is superior,
he contends, is better left to individual plaintiffs to resolve according
to the needs of their case.2 9 Professor Fiss focuses his attack on the
element of equitable jurisdiction that brings the subordination of the
injunction into sharpest perspective: the requirement that plaintiff
establish the need for an injunction to avoid irreparable harm,30 or
the similar requirement that plaintiff have no adequate remedy at
law. 31 Other critics have made similar attacks: some scholars question whether equity courts should retain the irreparable-injury requirement,3 2 and another may have come close to defining it out of
33
existence.
The critics are partially correct. The injunction does occupy an inferior hierarchical position in the law of remedies. In an action for
damages, plaintiff need not establish that the harm he suffers is substantial.3 To obtain an injunction, however, plaintiff must show that
35
the equitable remedy is necessary to avert substantial harm. In addition, the irreparability-adequacy requirement permits courts to
deny injunctive relief to some plaintiffs who face certain and substantial wrongs. In such cases, the courts will devalue plaintiffs rights by
substituting for injunctive relief the prospect of compensation or consolation. In short, defendant is left free to infringe plaintiff's rights
other way
and, at most, either pay plaintiff damages later, or in some
36
proceeding.
non-equity
a
in
transgression
the
rescind
28. 0. Fiss, supra note 27, at 1.
29. Id. at 6. Professor Fiss advocates a nonhierarchical approach for all types of
injunctions, not just the civil rights injunction. Id.
30. Id. at 38-39.
31. For a comparison of the irreparability and adequacy requirements and the conclusion that the two are not identical, see infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
32. See Hammond, supra note 27, at 276; Rendleman, supra note 27, at 347-48.
33. Quoting Terrence v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923), Professor Laycock suggests that "no legal remedy is adequate unless it is 'as complete, practical and efficient
as that which equity could afford.' "Laycock, supra note 27, at 1071. This formulation of
the adequacy requirement is well-known, see W. DEFUNIAK, supra note 26, at 9-10; H.
MCCL'TOCK, supra note 14, at 103; Simpson, Fifty Years of American Equity, 50 HARV.
L. REV. 171, 237 (1936), but it no longer reflects federal doctrine. On the resurgence of
the adequacy requirement, see infra note 73.
Accepting Professor Laycock's formulation would, of course, greatly emasculate the
adequacy requirement: compensation for harm would rarely be as "complete, practical
and efficient" to the plaintiff as avoiding the harm altogether.
34. Since Congress eliminated the amount-in-controversy requirement for federalquestion cases, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. V 1981), the federal courts have had jurisdiction
to hear every case arising under the Constitution or federal laws, regardless of the
harm incurred by plaintiffs. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 529 (1981) (court
entertained a claim of $23.50 in a damage action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981)).
35. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
36. For example, a federal court could refuse to enjoin state criminal proceedings

19831

The critics accurately identify the effect of equitable jurisdiction in
producing hierarchy of remedies; but in suggesting that elements of
equitable jurisdiction should be forsaken because they no longer
serve their purpose, they attack straw men. Critics typically identify
two rationales for the irreparability-adequacy requirement: that it is
a need generated by the maintenance of law and equity as separate
systems, and that it is a means of assuring the right to a jury trial,
which is available only in actions at law. 37 They argue against retaining the requirement by suggesting that both justifications have weakened considerably over time.38 The trend toward merger of law and
equity 39 may indeed have undercut the first argument in favor of the
irreparability-adequacy requirement. However, the case for the requirement has not weakened much because of the merger. Similarly,
the desire to preserve jury trials may once have been a more persuasive argument for the irreparability-adequacy requirement than it is
today.4° But the case for the irreparability-adequacy requirement
does not depend on that argument either. 41 The contemporary justifications for the irreparability-adequacy requirement and other elements of equitable jurisdiction that subordinate the injunction in the
heirarchy of remedies have nothing to do with jury trials or the
merger of law and equity.
C. The Function of Equitable Jurisdiction
The restrictions that appear as elements of equitable jurisdiction
upon a sufficient expectation that the state criminal court will dismiss them. This appears to have happened in Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), since the
Supreme Court invalidated the local ordinance under attack in Douglas on the same
day it decided that case. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). For
further discussion of the relation between the two cases, see HART & WEcHsLER, supra
note 9, at 1012 n.l.
37. 0. Fiss, supra note 27, at 44, 50-51; W. WASH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 134 (1930);
Hammond, supra note 27, at 240-49; Laycock, supra note 27, at 1078-83.
38. 0. Fiss, supra note 27, at 51; Laycock, supra note 27, at 1079-82. Interesting research and argument has recently surfaced for the position that the merger of law and
equity should be cause for greater rather than less restraint in the exercise of equitable power. Professor McDowell takes this position in his book, Equity and the Constitution, and ascribes the same view to Francis Bacon, Joseph Story, and antifederalists
who participated in the the constitutional debates. G. McDowEsI, supra note 9, at 7-8,
27, 44, 80.
39. Law and equity merged in England with passage of the Judicature Acts of 1873
and 1875. See F. MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 15. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
merged law and equity in American federal courts in 1938. See F. JAmEs & G. HAZARD,
supra note 10, at 21-22. For a review of the state-court movement, which began in New
York in 1848, see Simpson, supra note 33, at 179, and H. McCLnerocK, supra note 14, at
13-14 & n.46.
40. See D. DOBBS, supra note 13, at 61 (arguing that jury trials have simply become
less significant in most cases). Now seems a particularly poor time to attribute much
importance to the right to a jury trial, given that the right, especially in complex civil
litigation, is in the process of redefinition. See generally Lempert, Civil Juries and
Complex Cases:Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68 (1981) (discussing the
difficulties of attempting to limit the right to jury trial in complex cases); Luneburg &
Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals:Alternativesfor
Copingwith the Complexities of Modern Litigation, 67 VA. L REV. 887 (1981) (discussing possible alternatives to jury trials in complex civil litigation).
41. See H. McCLIrocy, supra note 14, at 48-49. But see D. DOBBS, supra note 13,
at 61 (asserting that the primary reason today for retaining the adequacy requirement
is that the plaintiff who seeks equitable relief has precluded the possibility for defendant to obtain a jury trial).
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serve to minimize the number of injunctions that courts issue. The
particularly onerous burdens that the injunction places upon the defendant and the issuing court necessitate these constraints.
Remission of plaintiff to a damage proceeding may debase the
value of his right,42 but the issuance of an injunction may exact an
exaggerated cost from the defendant. The injunction's purpose is to
avert harm to the plaintiff by incapacitating the defendant. Incapacitation poses the threat of adjusting more aspects of the defendant's
behavior than those that would wrong the plaintiff if the injunction
were not issued. It is difficult if not impossible to so finely adjust an
order that it protects plaintiff without impairing defendant's harmless activities or the rights of those who are not represented before
43
the court.
A second burden that defendant must bear as the addressee of an
injunction is the specter of civil and criminal contempt. 4 It is not always easy to determine the meaning and scope of an injunction, and
defendants who wish to protect themselves against contempt liability
must sometimes choose between foregoing desired behavior and un45
dergoing the cost of clarifying or modifying the injuction.
Injunction proceedings also place special burdens on courts. Unlike the trial of factual issues in damage actions, trial in injunction
proceedings is future-directed. 46 The judge must contend with a
42. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
43. Some object to allowing the defendant the option of wronging plaintiff and
then paying damages, see, e.g., Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term - Foreward:
Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L REV. 4, 45-46 n.260 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Chayes, Public Law Litigation], but at least that serves to confine the remedy to plaintiff's proper sphere of concern. In contrast, to require by injunction that the defendant close his business in order to cease the pollution of
plaintiff's property imposes a much cruder remedy. If plaintiff had sought an injunction to close the same business in order to ruin shareholders, render employees jobless, or erode the local tax base, the injunction would, of course, have been denied. Yet
these effects may flow just as certainly from an injunction sought and granted on antipollution grounds.
Of course, it may be possible in some cases to so tailor or condition injunctive relief
as to ameliorate the burden on defendant. See Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108
Ariz. 178, 186, 494 P.2d 700, 708 (1972) (en banc); Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1301-09 (1977); ef. Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414,440 (1944) (describing the court's discretion to "avoid such inconvenience
and injury so far as may be, by attaching conditions to the award, such as the requirement of an injunction bond conditioned upon payment of any damage caused by the
injunction if plaintiffs contentions are not sustained").
44. Disobedience of an injunction gives rise to liability for civil contempt; moreover, willful disobedience may give rise to criminal liability. Developments - Injunctions, supra note 10, at 1086. See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56
CORNELL L. REV. 183, 235-49 (1971) (discussing the procedural consequences of classifying a contempt proceeding as criminal or civil).
45. For an examination of contempt, clarification, and modification proceedings,
see Developments - Injuctions,supra note 10, at 1078-91.
46. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). Attempts to further divide injunctions into mandatory and prohibitory injunctions, e.g. Kettenhofen v.
Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 189, 191, 358 P.2d 684, 685, 10 Cal. Rptr. 356, 357 (1961), are
unprofitable, because of the impossibility in certain cases of determining whether the
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number of competing hypotheses - all to a greater or lesser degree
speculative 47 - about expected events and behavior. He must grapple
with language for the decree that is sufficiently clear to govern the
future, and preside over differences of opinion about what the language of the decree does or should mean. Finally, he must place the
dignity of his judicial office on the line in demanding obedience to his
order.
The implications of the injuction for the litigants and the court suggest the need for careful decision making. Despite the avowed intention of courts to use their considerable discretion to strike balances
to fit the particular case, the censure that critics 49 have directed
against equitable restraint may derive in part from a not unjustified
dissatisfaction with judges' failure to balance difficult considerations
in a thoughtful, closely reasoned way. This failure is particularly evi50
dent in equity cases brought by government enforcement agencies.
But it is as much the nature of equity doctrine to experience rebirth 51
as ossification. If used properly, the elements that this Article asserts
should compose equitable jurisdiction can today accommodate the
variables to decide the difficult cases.
1.

Immediate and Substantial Harm

Both English and American equity courts developed the requirements that harm necessary to justify an injunction be immediate and
substantial. One of the best illustrations of their use appears in the
English Chancery case, Fletcherv. Bealey. 52 The plaintiff feared that
the river water it used to produce high-quality paper products would
be polluted so as to make plaintiff's continued operation impossible.53 It sought an injunction against defendant as the potential polinjunction's desired effect is to prohibit or to order an affirmative act, see Developments
- Injunctions, supra note 10, at 1062-63. It is enough to say that all injunctions are
future-directed in that they all seek to protect the plaintiff by removing a behavioral
choice of the defendant.
47. Of course there are injunction cases in which, absent an apocalypse, the shape
of the future is reasonably clear, just as there are damage cases that require guesswork about the future. See Leubsdorf, Remedies for Uncertainty, 61 B.U.L. REv. 132, 137
(1981). Courts may sometimes find it more difficult to estimate damages than to frame
an injunction. Id. at 142. However, most damage awards are in compensation for past
wrongs. Courts awarding damages treat evidence as empirical data tending to prove
historical incidents of interest to the litigants. Issues in such cases may be difficult, but
at least the past has already happened - and it happened only one way.
48. "The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do
equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility
rather than rigidity has distinguished it." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
The passage is quoted with approval in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61
(1975).
49. See authorities cited supra note 27; L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 346-47; Emmerglick, supra note 14, at 248-50; Pound, supra note 14, at 29.
50. See infra notes 98-159 and accompanying text.
51. Equity is capable of continual adjustment and growth. See Redden, Equity: A
Visit to the FoundingFathers, 31 VA. L. REv. 753, 753 (1945); Simpson, supra note 33, at
751. For an early illustration of how instrumental utility can be derived from ostensibly
wooden equity dogma, see Professor McClintock's seminal article, Adequacy ofIneffective Remedy at Law, 16 MINN.L. REv. 233 (1942) (asserting that a remedy available at
law may not be adequate if the remedy is in practice ineffective).
52. 28 Ch. D. 688 (1885).
53. Id. at 690.
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luter, alleging that defendant was negligently maintaining a chemical
waste dump upstream.5 4 There was no proof that defendant had polluted the river in the past; therefore the court required plaintiff to
show "proof of imminent danger" and "proof that the apprehended
damage will, if it comes, be very substantial." 55
Plaintiff offered three different hypotheses about the future. Plaintiff argued that a "pernicious" liquid would ooze from the chemical
waste and flow into the river.5 6 Rejecting this argument, the court
reasoned that if the liquid reached the river, it might do so only after
a considerable length of time. By then it was probable that scientists
working on pollution control would discover a way to render the liquid innocuous. 7 Plaintiff also alleged that a landslide would cause
defendant's chemical waste to fall into the river.58 The court doubted
that the landslide would occur, and, if it did, that it would carry the
refuse into the river, or more than temporarily delay plaintiff's business. 59 Finally, plaintiff asserted that a canal wall would collapse and
cause the waste to fall into the river.60 Though conceding that the
wall had fallen several times, 6 1 the court nevertheless denied plaintiff's request for an injunction, as it was uncertain whether the wall
62
would break again and unsure about the resulting damage if it did.
Fletcher illustrates how equity courts can effectively use the requirements of imminence and substantiality in tandem. But the requirements should be understood to represent different concerns.
The concept of prematurity implicit in the imminence requirement
suggests that there exists a period of time during which neither of
two possible outcomes can be considered as unlikely to occur. Eventually, the plaintiff will either be able to assure the court of impending harm and still retain the opportunity to avert harm by securing an
injunction, 63 or plaintiffs fear of being harmed by the defendant will
54. Id.
55. Id. at 698.
56. Id. at 690.
57. Id. at 700. The court also hypothesized several devices that would prevent the
liquid from flowing into the river. Id.
58. Id. at 690.
59. Id. at 701-02.
60. Id. at 690.
61. It fell, I think, in 1876, and it fell again curiously enough confirming the
predictions of the Plaintiff's witnesses, between the month of August, when
the trial of this action was commenced, and the month of December, when
the hearing was resumed. In August the Defendants' witnesses magnified
the beauty and excellence of this wall, and said that it had been built with
the greatest possible care at an expense of 20,000 [pounds], and that it
would stand as long as the world lasted. But, notwithstanding, in the month
of October, another fall occurred.
Id. at 702.
62. Id. at 703.
63. When the prospect of harm has come so near that there is no longer time for
plaintiff to secure an injunction, the court has waited too long. Procedures for obtaining presumably rapid interlocutory injunctive relief in federal and many state
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prove unwarranted. Time will tell which possibility materializes, and
it seems fair for the court to refuse to enjoin defendent's activity during the interim. If the plaintiff obtains an injunction prematurely, the
court will never know which possibility would have occurred. The defendant will then have lost the opportunity to demonstrate by his voluntary future conduct that plaintiff's fears were unjustified. Imposing
the burdens of a possibly needless injunction on defendant and the
court is unwarranted. 64
The requirement of substantial harm suggests a different concept.
One might think that once plaintiff shows that a legal wrong underlies his request for an injunction, 65 the court's inquiry into substantive law is at an end.66 The substantiality test indicates that such a
supposition is impossible. Applying the test strictly, a court may
deny a request for an injunction to a plaintiff in imminent danger of
67
being wronged by a defendant because the wrong is not substantial.
That this seems to discredit and perhaps redefine substantive law
may explain the apparent reluctance of equity courts to characterize
imminent wrongs as insubstantial.
The most significant use of the substantiality requirement is to bolster the imminence requirement. In Fletcher v. Bealey,6 8 the court
questioned whether a landslide would occur, whether the landslide
would carry pollutants into the water, and whether the pollution
would cause plaintiff great harm. 69 Note the court's scarcely perceptible shift from imminence questions one and two to substantiality
question three. The court's rhetoric is: "no harm is imminent, at least
no real harm."
2. The Irreparability-AdequacyRequirement
The requirement that, to obtain equitable relief, a plaintiff must have
no adequate remedy at law, is derived from early English Chancery
practice. 70 Some scholars assert that the adequacy requirement and
the requirement that the harm to be averted by the injunction be irreparable represent but one rule.71 Indeed, courts frequently collapse
the two into one. 72 Maintaining two formulations of a rule that emcourts should have the effect of extending the period of prematurity. On the nature
and availability of interlocutory injunctive relief, see Leubsdorf, The Standardfor Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HIv. L. REv. 525 (1978).
64. Federal courts may perceive this issue as one of subject-matter jurisdiction,
viewing the argued speculative nature of the harm as raising case or controversy
problems under article Ill of the United States Constitution. See Babbit v. United
Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297-305 (1979); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
493-99 (1974).
65. Plaintiff must assert a legal wrong to justify his request for an injunction. McClintock, supra note 51, at 255; Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion,
70 CALF. L. REV. 524, 530 & n.21 (1982).
66. Cf Rendleman, supra note 27, at 348 ("Remedial doctrine does not concern
itself with defining substantive interests but, instead, concerns itself with the proper
method of vindicating interests that wrongdoers have injured.").
67. In such cases, plaintiffs may eventually be able to obtain nominal damages.
68. 28 Ch. 688 (1885).
69. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
70. See F. MArreAND, supra note 10, at 4-7; W. WALSH, supra note 37, at 132.
71. See 0. Fiss, supra note 27, at 38; Laycock, supra note 27, at 1070.
72. E.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982); Rondeau v.
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ploy such dissimilar language invites mischief. 73 If they both expressed the same idea, it might be desirable to discard one or the
other. But, similar as the tests are, they do not express quite the
same idea.
The adequate-remedy-at-law formulation poses the question: is it
fair to permit plaintiff to seek an injunction when plaintiff could have
selected a less onerous remedy - perhaps damages - that would, in
a rough sense, protect the same interests? The irreparable-injury formulation poses the somewhat different question: are there other
noninjunctive proceedings that are likely to repair, in a rough sense,
the harm plaintiff seeks to avert by injunction?
Application of the Supreme Court's instruction in Douglas v. City
of Jeannette,74 illustrates the difference between the irreparable-injury and adequate-remedy-at-law formulations. In Douglas, plaintiff
sought an injunction in federal district court against the threatened
enforcement in state court of a municipal-tax and -licensing ordinance alleged to be unconstitutional. 75 The Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of equity jurisdiction, reasoning that a
federal court should be particularly careful to scrutinize cases for
want of equity jurisdiction "where its powers are invoked to interfere
by injunction with threatened criminal prosecutions in a state
76

court.1

For a federal court to rule in a case like Douglas that it will not
enjoin a state criminal proceeding because the plaintiff's status as a
criminal defendant gives him an adequate remedy at law77 is nonsensical. An individual in the pressed and involuntary straits of a crimiMosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S.
500, 506-07 (1959).
73. At one point in federal equity practice, courts appeared to have administered
the two differently. At the same time the irreparable injury requirement was enforced,
see Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 527 (1926); Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdictionand the Revision of the JudicialCode, 13 LAW & CONTEmP. PROBs. 216, 227
(1948), the requirement that plaintiff have no adequate remedy at law was lightly regarded. Two reasons explain the disregard of the latter requirement. Wording of the
standard was exceedingly lax. See supra note 33. In addition, with the exception of
injunctions against state tax cases, federal courts interpreted the standard to require
that plaintiff have no adequatefederal remedy. James, FederalEquity Jurisdictionto
EnjoinActs of State Officers, 18 IOwA L. REV. 1, 19 (1932); Simpson, supra note 33, at 237
nn.391-92; see Keaton v. Little, 34 F.2d 396, 398 (10th Cir. 1929).
Now the two rules appear to be on a par in federal court. The irreparability requirement has retained its vitality, see AhmmcAN LAw INSTrrUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF
JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 206 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
ALI STUDY], while the adequacy requirement has gained comparable potency, see
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425 (1979); see also cases cited supra note 72.
74. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
75. Id. at 160.
76. Id. at 162. Justice Stone observed that federal injunctive interference could be
justified only if it would prevent clear and imminent irreparable injury; equitable remedies infringing on a state's independence should be denied if sought on inconsequential grounds, even if they might otherwise be granted. Id. at 163.
77. Justice Rehnquist adopts this position. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 425
(1979) (citing Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. at 164, as authority). For a similarly
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nal accused hardly enjoys a "remedy." In contrast, the irreparableinjury requirement can justify the denial of an injunction in such
cases. It is not relevant whether the state criminal trial is not a remedy, or that the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to invoke
it, as long as the prospect of prosecution is certain. If the constitutional claim that plaintiff seeks to have resolved and enforced by injunction can also be resolved by the state criminal court and enforced
through dismissal of criminal charges, the question becomes whether
the value to the plaintiff in vindicating his right in federal court justifies the burden the
equity proceeding places on the defendant and
78
the federal court.
3. Manageability
Courts unable to decide the proper language and scope of a decree, or
how and whether it can be enforced, should refuse to issue an injunction, on grounds that it would not be manageable. 79 An injunction issued under such circumstances would likely be unclear or overinclusive, and therefore would exacerbate many of the problems considered earlier.80 These injunctions will usually impair aspects of defendant's behavior that are not properly plaintiff's concern. They are
also likely to create dangers of contempt liability for defendants or
the expense of supplementary proceedings. In addition, unmanageable injunctions will almost certainly dissipate the court's energy and
diminish its prestige.
4. Structure and Flexibility
The foregoing attempt to attribute contemporary functions to traditional elements of equitable jurisdiction suggests some outer limits
on their legitimate use. But courts must be free to balance these elements in individual cases because they will necessarily vary.8 1 This
Article urges a reformation of the present system of equitable jurisdiction, in which to announce the rule is to decide the case. What is
needed is a framework of considerations that is sensitive to the way
factors in the injunction dispute will register and combine differently
inappropriate attempt to join inadequacy and irreparability, see Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
78. See infra notes 178-91.
79. That problems in framing or enforcing the decree may justify denying the requested remedy is not, in itself, a new idea. Marble Co. v. Ripley, 77 U.S. 339, 358-59
(1870); Developments in the Law - Equity - 1933, 47 HAnv. L. REV. 1174, 1185 (1934)
[hereinafter cited as Developments - Equity]. The term, "manageability," may, however, be new to this context. Its more familiar use is with reference to class action suits
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) (3). See Developments in the Law - Class
Actions, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1318, 1498-1504 (1976).
80. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
81. Whether the harm to the plaintiff is imminent is a question of fact. See United
States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 635 (1953). Though it may be less obvious, so is
the irreparability-adequacy question. Professor Fiss observes that "inadequacy is not
a dichotomous quality, but rather permits of degree. . . ." 0. Fiss, supra note 27, at 38;
cf. D. DOBBS, supra note 13, at 61 ("Adequacy is open ended; it does not exist as a
matter of rule, but as a matter of fact. Whether a legal remedy is adequate or not, and
how it compares with equity remedies, is a matter for analysis in each case."). Each
case also has its own dimensions of manageability. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n
No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 551-52 (1937).
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in each case. Properly understood and applied, the elements comprising the author's theory of equitable jurisdiction have the instru82
mental capacity to meet that need.
The requirements of imminence, substantiality, irreparability-adequacy, and manageability can serve as elements of a methodology
leading to principled and well-reasoned decisions to deny or grant
injunctions. The methodology movement in modem procedure derives from two related ideas: that certainties assumed by legal formalism are illusory and should be rejected in favor of a more
instrumental view urging flexible, policy-centered understanding of
each case's differing demands;83 and that although some types of procedural controversies can be easily resolved by the application of
rules, 84 others can not.85 Instead of assigning the controversy to a category of cases governed by a single decisional rule, the methodological approach evaluates it according to a series of guidelines designed
to ascertain the presence and intensity of facts related to policies
served by the decision. These guidelines may be regarded as rules but to apply them is not to decide the case, but rather to describe the
method by which the case will be evaluated. The movement has been
influential in choice of law,86 res judicata, 87 personal,8 8 and federal
82. This view rejects the conclusion suggested by contemporary attacks on equity,
see supra text accompanying notes 27-33, that equity doctrine is incurably formalistic.
83. Distinctions between functional or instrumental jurisprudence and earlier, formalistic jurisprudence have been the subject of recent commentary. See generally Lyons, Legal Formalismand Instrumentalism - A PathologicalStudy, 66 CORNELL L.
REv. 949 (1981) (discussing the doctrines of formalism and instrumentalism and rejecting the instrumentalists' criticisms of formalistic doctrine); Summers, Pragmatic
Instrumentalism in Twentieth Century American Legal Thought - A Synthesis and
Critique of OurDominant General Theory About Law and its Use, 66 CORNELL L REV.
861 (1981) (attempting to advance the undiscovered potential for instrumentalism as a
legal doctrine). Professor Summers suggests that formalism reflects a belief in law as
"a static and closed legal system," one in which there is "always one 'true rule,' ascertainable by reason" and that "laws of governance are laws similar to universal laws of
nature." Id. at 867 n.4. He contrasts the later, "nonformalistic" view as one in which
"law is like a dynamic and open framework" and that there are a "plurality of plausible
forms of law for the usual problem." Id. Professor Summers describes this general
reaction to formalism, which he calls "pragmatic instrumentalism," as particularly active during the first half of this century. Id. at 865.
Closest to the shift in equity thinking advocated in this Article are trends in procedure that have developed in this century. Typically, these developments have not been
categorized as functional or instrumental, but it may be helpful to regard them as such.
84. For example, whether suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981), were
exempt from the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976), and whether the language
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c) (2) had to be followed in every class action
brought under paragraph (b) (3) of the rule, were not fact-variable controversies. Once
they were authoritatively settled, see Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (section 1983 suits exempted); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974) ((c) (2)
must be followed), courts could administer all cases under the same rule.
85. For example, to conclude that adjudication in the absence of an important
party is intolerable in one case is not to conclude that it is always intolerable. See
Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right - Toward a New Methodologyfor Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 894, 908-10 (1980).
86. For a comparison between the formalistic vested rights approach of the First
Restatement of Conflict of Laws with the Second Restatement's sensitivity to party
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subject-matter jurisdiction,8 9 and in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 90
The movement's delay in reaching equity can be explained in part
by the tendency among scholars to view equity doctrine as accreting
around substantive areas rather than yielding to general theory, 91
and in part because, ironically, equity anticipated some of a modem
methodology's discretion and flexibility during the halcyon period of
formalism. 92 Limits drawn to defend and preserve equity in that hostile climate 93 now cause its growth to lag in a more progressive era.
The utility of these elements of equitable jurisdiction in a decisional methodology is twofold. Each has its own resonance illuminating a different sector of concern about the injunction's
appropriateness in the particular case. In addition, the elements can
be combined to create a decisional framework that justifies issuing as
well as denying an injunction. 94 As the applicant successfully meets
the requirements of equitable jurisdiction, his case should gather
fairness, see Shreve, In Search of a Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard- Reflections
on Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 66 MNmN. L. REV. 327, 343-44 (1982); see also Alexander,
The Concept of Function and the Basis of Regulatory Interests Under Functional
Choice of Law Theory: The Significance of Benefit and the Insignificance of Intention,
65 VA. L. REV. 1063 (1979) (traditional conflicts theory focused upon territorial constraints, whereas modern theory requires interpretation and construction of statutes
and common law rules).
87. See Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata:Reflections on the Parklane Doctrine,
55 IND. L.J. 615, 615-20 (1980).
88. Compare the territorial formalism of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 721-32 (1877),
with the pragmatic approach of determining the defendant's contacts with the forum
state in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-19 (1945).
89. On the test for pendent jurisdiction, compare the formalism of Hum v. Oursler,
289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933) ("two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of
action ....
), with the more pragmatic test under UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966) ('The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact... such that [the plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one
judicial proceeding ....
").
Developments in federal subject-matter jurisdiction that would require reinterpretation of longstanding statutory provisions have moved more slowly. This is probably
attributable, at least in part, to judicial reluctance to change even an antiquated view
of a statute once courts have made a decisive interpretation of legislative intent. See E.
LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 32 (1948).
90. Circumstances leading to the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938 are described in detail in Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015
(1982), and R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1952). The rules were drafted under the guidance of Dean Charles Clark and
reflect, to a degree, his nonformalistic view of the nature and purpose of procedure. See
generally PROCEDURE -

THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS OF JUDGE CHARLES E.

CLARK (C. Wright & H. Reasoner ed. 1965).
Methodological self-sufficiency has been realized to varying degrees in the Federal
Rules. See, e.g., Shreve, supra note 85, at 910-24 (discussing the success of Rule 19 and
Rule 24's failure to achieve this self-sufficiency).
91. This is apparent in the general organizational approach of treatise authors, see
D. DOBBS, supra note 13; W. DE FUNIAK, supra note 26; H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 14,
and casebook editors, see, e.g., R. LEAvELL, J. LOVE & G. NELSON, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES AND REsTrrUrION (3d ed. 1980); K. YORK & J. BAUMAN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES (3d ed. 1979). But see 0. FISS, INJUNCTIONS (1972) (divided into sections discussing substantive and procedural aspects of equity doctrine).
92. See supra notes 10, 14.
93. See supra note 14.
94. The criteria of a true decisional methodology must carry the potential for justifying opposite results when material differences in succeeding cases are great enough.
There must be, in other words, advertent juxtaposition of opposing interests within
one framework. For example, the factors set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
19(b) to aid the court in deciding whether to continue or dismiss the plaintiff when an
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force. 95 If all elements are satisfied, perhaps the applicant should
have a right to an injunction. At the very least, the court should carefully justify its decision to deny an injunction, because the applicant
has shown that he will soon suffer a substantial wrong that damages
could not repair, and that only an injunction, which could
be framed
96
and administered without serious difficulty, could avert.

II.
A.

Equitable Discretionand the Crucible of Public
Interest

Equitable Discretion and the Mandatory Injunction

When public law-enforcement officers argue against either the grant
or denial of an injunction on the grounds that the judgment could
frustrate realization of the goals of laws they are appointed to en-

force, equity faces a formidable challenge.9 7 One powerful invocation
absent party, whose joinder would be required "if feasible," cannot be joined, demonstrate this juxtaposition.
95. Present equity practice reflects this idea in one respect. In many federal
courts, the applicant for a preliminary injunction is relieved of the burden of demonstrating a likelihood of prevailing on the merits, if the harm he will suffer absent the
preliminary injunction is great enough. The plaintiff need only establish a substantial
question on the merits of the case. See Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206
F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1953);see also William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1975) (requiring plaintiff to show that serious questions are raised by his case and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor);
11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948, at 453-55 (1973)
(suggesting that if plaintiff makes a showing of substantial harm, he still needs to show
some probability that he will succeed on the merits, but the standard to be met is
lower).
96. Later I suggest that Supreme Court decisions overturning injunctions under
the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), fall short of meeting this substantial burden of justification. See supra note 231. Of additional concern are recent cases
like Weinberger v. Romero-Barcello, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), which, though in an unclear
manner, seem to go beyond the essentials of equitable jurisdiction and refuse to issue
an injunction through a kind of vague balancing of the equities.
97. Appeals to the public interest are not found solely in suits brought by public
officers. The equity reports are sprinkled with decisions in which private parties seeking or opposing injunctions have been able to influence the outcome of litigation by
affiliating their interest with that of the public. D. DOBBS, supra note 13, at 65; H. McCLnrroci, supra note 14, at 193-94 Developments - Equity, supra note 79, at 1184, 1194.
Private parties seeking injunctions are at times even regarded as surrogates for public
law-enforcement authorities. See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1281, 1292-95 (1976) (remarking on the increase in public-interest
litigation and its effect of shifting the conception of litigation from that of a mechanism
to settle private disputes to one of resolving questions of government program management; and suggesting that, in such cases, equitable remedies are no longer considered "extraordinary" relief) [hereinafter cited as Chayes, Role of Judges]; cf Chayes,
Public Law Litigation,supra note 43, at 4 (suggesting that whether or not the private
laintiff successfully obtains requested relief is not determinative of whether a suit is
'pubic law litigation"; rather, the nature of the controversy, sources of governing law,
and impact of a decision differentiate public from private litigation).
The problem whether or how to give public-interest weight to private-litigant arguments is one of dilemmatic proportions. See Mensch, The History of MainstreamLegal
Though, in THE PoL'rIcs OF LAw 37 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (suggesting that whether the
interests of some private litigants are more public than others may be more of a political than a legal question); Chayes, Role of Judges, supra, at 1311 (exploring the prob-
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of the public interest is the argument that Congress has statutorily
limited the court's equitable jurisdiction. Several judges 9 8 and commentators 99 have suggested that Congress might have the power to
withdraw the federal courts' discretionary power and require courts
to issue injunctions automatically, upon proof of unlawful activity.
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 100 the leading decision presenting the issue of
Congress's power to limit equitable discretion, arose when the administrator of the Office of Price Administration brought suit under
section 205 (a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 against defendant, a department store. Section 205(a) provided in part that
"upon a showing by the administrator that" defendant "has engaged
* , * in"violations of the Act, "a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order shall be granted without bond."''1 1
Plaintiff-administrator sought an injunction against the defendant after demonstrating extensive previous violations of the Act. The district court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that defendant was
trying hard to comply with the Act, that its record of compliance
would improve, and that an injunction would not facilitate such improvement. 10 2 The District of Columbia Circuit reversed, construing
the statute to require the district court to issue the injunction upon
03
proof of past violations of the Act.
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari raised the possibility of a
constitutional confrontation between Congress and the Court. If the
Supreme Court refused to affirm the order of injunction, it might appear to be rejecting the statute altogether. For the nonelected federal
judicial branch to so impede Congress's substantive law-enforcement
lem of determining whether private parties invoking the public interest are genuinely
interested in and informed of the public impact of the litigation or simply searching for
another favorable argument); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARv.L. REV. 1667, 1760-70 (1975) (same). Of course, a court must be aware of
the possibility of public harm or inconvenience flowing from its injunction decision. At
the same time, it will often be ill-suited and poorly aided in determining where the
public interest lies.
How the courts are to extricate themselves from this dilemma is an important question. The question is not, however, central to this Article. The most interesting and
formidable public-interest challenge to the viability and coherence of modem doctrines of federal equitable jurisdiction does not come from private litigants attempting
to afliate themselves with public-interest arguments, but from government officials
who argue that the failure either to grant or deny an injunction will frustrate realization of goals they are appointed to enforce. Such litigants are the most forceful publicinterest advocates because they have only public-interest arguments to make.
98. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 65 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 56 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., and Harlan, J., concurring); FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517
F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976).
99. See Plater, supra note 65, at 527-33 (although Professor Plater proposes that
equity courts retain some discretion in enjoining statutory violations); Note, The Statutory Injunction as an Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies, 57 YALE L.J. 1023,
1026-27 (1948) (observing that statutes materially change judicial discretion to deny
injunctive relief; but that plaintiffs relying upon statutes must still show a possibility
of future violation).
100. 321 U.S. 321 (1943).
101. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch.26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23, 33 (terminated
1947).
102. Brown v. Hecht Co., 49 F. Supp. 528,531-32 (D.D.C.), rev'd 137 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir
1943), rev'd sub nom. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
103. Brown v. Hecht Co., 137 F.2d 689, 693-695 (D.C. Cir 1943), rev'd sub nom. Hecht
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
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policies, without assessing the constitutionality of these policies,
would arguably violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.10 4 Yet if
the Court granted the injunction, it might be admitting that Congress
could usurp the federal courts' power to decide when to issue injunctions. Such a ruling could erode the independence and integrity of
the judicial process that article
H of the Constitution presumably
05
affords the federal courts.1
The Supreme Court managed to escape the horns of this dilemma.
Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas construed the phrase, "or
other order," as granting the trial court the discretion to refuse to
issue an injunction, so long as it issued some other order in its
place.' 0 6 As an example, the Court suggested that the trial court
could order the case continued pending disclosure of defendants'
subsequent performance 0 7 Justice Douglas concluded that Congress could not have intended the language of section 205(a) to require something so unconventional as a mandatory injunction. 0 8
The Court rendered a narrow decision, and its interpretation of the
statute was strained, to say the least. 0 9 The language of the opinion
gives little guidance as to the proper roles for Congress and the federal courts in cases similar to Hecht,110 and these roles have not yet
been elaborated in a helpful manner."' Two factors may explain this.
104. Two concerns underlie the issues of the appropriate sphere of federal authority raised in this Article: whether the integrity of a federal institution might be compromised, and whether a litigant might be forced to bear a result lacking in legitimacy.
Regarding the latter point, consider Professor Tribe's view of the development of the
separation of powers doctrine: '"The upshot is to require, in most instances, that at
least two full branches of the federal government cooperate before governmental
choices potentially hostile to individual rights or needs can be effected." L. TRmE,
AMERICAN CONSTrTIONAL LAW 16 (1978) (emphasis added).
105. For development of article M concerns in this context, see infra notes 122-28
and accompanying text.
106. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328 (1944).
107. Id. at 328.
108. Id. at 329-30. For purposes of this Article, the term "mandatory injunction"
refers to an injunction that appears to be statutorily mandated as a remedy, rather
than one that requires the addressee to act affirmatively.
109. As one commentator observed, '"The Court maneuvered the camel of discretion
through the proverbial needle's eye .....
Note, supra note 99, at 1027 n.17. For a more
satisfactory definition of the "or other order" provision of § 205(a), see Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399-400 (1946) (defining it to permit equitable
restitution).
110. Justice Douglas characterized the result sought by the OPA Administrator as a
"drastic," "major," and "abrupt" departure from federal equity tradition. 321 U.S. at
329-30. However, Congress rather clearly expressed its intent to authorize the injunction that the Hecht court refused. The case presented an appropriate occasion for the
Court to reconcile the competing demands of the separation of powers doctrine and
article I. But the holding's artificiality and equivocations rendered Hecht more of a
hinderance than a help.
111. Compare NLRB v. Cheney Cal. Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385, 389-91 (1946) (Stone,
J., concurring) (citing Hecht as authority for federal judicial independence) with
United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 58-59 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
and Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Hecht as authority for federal judicial deference to
Congress).
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Since Hecht, the prevailing practice has been for Congress to allow
more room for judicial discretion in describing the process for obtaining law-enforcement injunctions than it did in the Emergency
Price Control Act. 112 But equally important, courts can accommodate
a great deal of the public interest that supports the mandatory injunction when scrutinizing cases for the traditional elements of equitable jurisdiction. Consequently, the potential for conflict between
congressional purpose and the federal courts' equitable discretion is
considerably less than it might first appear. This can be understood
by considering how public-interest issues are accommodated in the
process of determining equitable-jurisdiction issues of imminence,
substantiality, irreparability-adequacy, and manageability.
Congress has rarely attempted to displace the federal courts' factfinding discretion to determine whether harm necessitating a statutorily based injunction is imminent. 113 The courts' power to refuse requests for injunctions for lack of imminence is widely
4
acknowledged."
The strongest challenge to federal judicial independence in making
an imminence inquiry may have come in United States v. W. T. Grant
Co. 115 The government sought an injunction against interlocking corporate directorates alleged to be in violation of section 8 of the Clayton Act of 1914. Section 15 of the Act gives the district courts
"jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations" of the Act. 116 Plaintiff
was ready to prove that defendant had violated the Act." 7 The district court, however, relied upon defendant's promise to cease violating the Act and dismissed the case. 118 The Supreme Court affirmed,
acknowledging that the dismissal left the defendant "free to return to
112. Some statutes provide for injunctive relief but seem intended merely to acknowledge the standing or duty of the government to bring suit. E.g., 7 U.S.C.
§ 2305(b) (1976) (unfair trade practices in agriculture); 46 U.S.C. § 1485 (1976) (violation of federal boat-safety standards). Other statutes authorize government injunctions "as the court may deem equitable." E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 522 (1976) (restraints of
trade in the fishing industry); 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1976) (similar restraints in agricultural
production). Another statute, now repealed, stated that the court "may" issue an injunction sought by the Attorney General on advice of the Atomic Energy Commission.
42 U.S.C. § 2280 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (violations of the atomic energy laws). Still
others state that the district court "shall" issue an injunction upon "a proper showing."
E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976) (federal securities violations); 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1976)
(false advertising). On the degree of judicial independence permissible under § 53 (a)
of Title 15, compare FTC v. Simeon Management Corp., 532 F.2d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 1976)
(district court must conduct independent determination before granting injunction to
ensure first amendment procedural safeguards), with FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg
Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1975) (district court erred in. balancing equities
after Commission made proper showing because the first amendment does not protect
the right to make false statements), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976).
113. Section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act, examined in Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, might be considered as such an attempt. Yet even that statute preserved the
Court's ability to make findings of past or future violations. Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23, 33 (terminated 1947).
114. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Bland, 241 F.2d 808, 810 (5th Cir. 1957); SEC v. Cenco, Inc.,
436 F. Supp. 193, 199-200 (N.D. 311. 1977); Goldberg v. Martin, 198 F. Supp. 836, 838-40
(S.D. Miss. 1961).
115. 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
117. 112 F. Supp. 336, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), afr'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 629
(1953).
118. 112 F. Supp. at 338.
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his old ways,""19 and that there was "a public interest in having the
legality of the practices settled .... -120 The Court nonetheless concluded that the government had failed to demonstrate that the district court's finding of1 no threat of further violation constituted an
12
abuse of discretion.
The significance of Grant lies in the Court's treatment of the issue
of imminent harm. The Court framed the issue in terms of mootness:
whether "there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation,
something more than the mere possibility" of wrongdoing. 122 The
Court thereby equated lack of imminent harm with the lack of a constituent element necessary to meet the "case or controversy" requirement of article II of the Constitution. 123 This parallel between
federal equitable jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction suggests that the Court is hesitant to appear to be avoiding its obligation
to exercise jurisdiction constitutionally granted to it by Congress.
The Court began early in its history to identify characteristics of federal adjudication as indispensible, refusing to decide cases in which
they were not present.12 4 The Court undoubtedly foresaw that such
refusals to adjudicate would be construed by critics as attempts to
subvert exercises of the popular will. Consequently, the Court was
usually careful to frame these issues in constitutional terms, thus
generating doctrine purporting to elaborate the meanings of "case"
and "controversy" in article III.125 It seems appropriate to draw a parallel between the imminence requirement of equitable jurisdiction
and the "case or controversy" requirement of article III. Issuing an
injunction without establishing a sufficient prospect of imminent
harm is an unsound use of equitable jurisdiction because it is wasteful, unfair, and potentially chaotic.' 26 For the same reasons, it is
likely to offend one of the constellation of doctrines under article
119. 345 U.S. at 632.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 634. The government was unable to show that the district court had "no
reasonable basis" for its decision. Id.
122. Id. at 633. Although the Court noted that it did not agree that the case was
moot, id. at 635, compare the analysis of the requirement of imminence appearing in
Part I of this Article with the Court's analysis quoted in the text accompanying this
note.
123. On mootness as an article Im doctrine, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & N. YOUNG,
HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 57-62 (1978 & Supp. 1982), and Note, The Mootness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HA{v. L. REV. 373, 374-79 (1974).
124. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (requirement of case or
controversy); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1793) (same); Correspondence of
the Justices, reprinted in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 64-66 (the Supreme
Court declines to serve an advisory function on foreign relations).
125. Discussing the constellation of doctrines under article III, Professor Bickel observed: "These are ideas central to the reasoning in Marbury v. Madison. They constitute not so much limitations of the power of judicial review as necessary supports for
[Chief Justice] Marshall's argument in establishing it." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 115 (1962); see also infra note 157.
126. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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III.127 Those elements of equitable jurisdiction that also advance policies underlying article I should be secure against congressional
128
abridgement by the mandatory injunction.
At the same time, the federal judiciary's attempts to conserve its
independence by seeking sanctuary in the Constitution are and
should be limited. The maxim that constitutional statutes may not be
nullified 129 applies fully to federal courts. 130 It is difficult, therefore, to
make as strong a case for federal judicial independence if the inquiry
shifts from imminence to substantiality.' 3 ' So long as public law-enforcement officers sought injunctions to avoid common-law wrongs,
courts did not need to differentiate between their functions as law
makers and law interpreters, feeling relatively free to question the
substantiality of the wrong.132 When legislatures largely took over
public law making, courts became confined to powers of statutory interpretation. 133 In addition, federal court opinions reveal an awareness of Congress's intent to repose considerable powers of
substantive law elaboration in federal enforcement agencies. 34 Consequently, courts' ability to question the substantiality of a legal
135
wrong should be limited.
Federal courts seem reluctant to subject federal governmental
plaintiffs to the burden of showing that no adequate remedy at law
exists. When the court poses the requirement in other cases, it is to
question the plaintiff's choice of an injunction to determine whether
plaintiff could have chosen a less-burdensome remedy that would adequately protect the same rights. 36 If an injunction is the only remedy the governmental plaintiff has standing to seek, the adequacy
requirement is easily satisfied. The question is more difficult if the
127. Among the possibilities are problems of ripeness or prematurity, or mootness.
For a further examination of the parallel between the imminence dimension of equitable jurisdiction and the requirements of article III, see infra note 161.
128. The manageability dimension of equitable jurisdiction also raises concerns in
common with article IlI. See infra notes 154-56.
129. See G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 96-97 (1977).
130. Federal courts have the authority to fashion their own common law rules of
decision only if Congress has failed to address the subject. See Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981).
131. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
132. A product of this freedom is the maxim: "equity will not enjoin a crime." See,
e.g., People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 880, 118 P.2d 472, 477 (1941).
133. See generally Note, Statutory Extension of Injunctive Law Enforcement, 45
HAZv. L. REV. 1096 (1932). Of course, the power available to the court through statutory
interpretation is not insignificant. As Professor Levi observed, "It is only folklore
which holds that a statute if clearly written can be completely unambiguous and applied as intended to a specific case." E. LEvi, supra note 89, at 5. Unrestrained exercises of statutory interpretation take the form of judicial rewriting of statutes. See G.
GILMORE, supra note 129, at 97; see also the discussion of Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra
note 109 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 41 (1959);
NLRB v. Cheney Cal. Lumber Co., 327 U.S. 385, 388 (1946).
135. It is difficult to determine precisely how often a substantiality issue is a factor
in the government's failure to obtain an injunction since, as Professor Plater has observed, "where a defendant's violation of a statute is de minimis, the courts are likely
to find that no violation has occurred." Plater, supra note 65, at 530 n.21. For an example of such a finding, see United States v. General Foods Corp., 446 F. Supp. 740, 754
(N.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 591 F.2d 1332 (2d Cir. 1978).
136. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
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1 37
governmental plaintiff may choose among several forms of relief.
But even then, the injunction may often be the alternative least onercourt - particularly if the other opous to the defendant and to 1the
38
tion is criminal prosecution.
Judicial opinions do not evince a willingness to make these distinctions. Federal courts probably are reluctant to undertake the secondguessing inherent in an adequacy inquiry because they hesitate to
question the judgment of another branch of the federal government. 139 This may explain the lack of closely reasoned inquiry into
the adequacy requirement in public-injunction cases.
Federal courts appear similarly reluctant to subject governmental
plaintiffs to an irreparability standard. 14 In neither case is this simply a matter of blind deference. The federal law-enforcement officer
may be the best judge of when and where to employ the injunction as
a law-enforcement tool. Most of the injunctions issued in such cases
would withstand an irreparability-adequacy inquiry. 141 At the same
time, judicial deference does not excuse the frequent failure of federal courts to explain how the essential concerns of equity have been
satisfied. This contributes to a larger trend toward doctrinal incoherence concerning the nature and limits of equitable restraint.'4
The manageability requirement poses special concerns in public-

injunction cases, as United Steelworkers of America v. United
States 143 illustrates. The dispute in that case arose when President
Eisenhower requested the Attorney General to sue under Section 208
137. These may include damage actions, condemnation, licensing suspension, or
criminal prosecution. The scope of options will vary with the statutory setting. See
Note, supra note 99, at 1034-36. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission
may respond to violations of federal securities laws by suspending security trading,
revoking security registration, seeking a federal injunction, or referring cases to the
Justice Department for criminal prosecution. See generally H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1982 SEcuRmrEs LAW HANDBOOK §§ 10.04, 24.01-03 (discussing the remedies available to the
SEC to enforce federal securities laws, and the utility of each remedy).
138. See Note, supra note 99, at 1048.
139. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 41 (1959), in
which the Court, in affirming the issuance of an injunction, refused to undertake an
adequacy inquiry, reasoning that Congress did not intend that the issuance of injunctions under the Labor Management Relations Act should depend on judicial inquiries
into the availability of other remedies. Accord SEC v. Jones, 15 F. Supp. 321, 322
(S.D.N.Y.), affid, 85 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 581 (1936).
140. See Note, supra note 99, at 1026. The same is not true when a private plaintiff
attempts to assume the role of public-law-enforcement officer. See Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 62-65 (1975).
141. For example, in United Steelworkers of America v. United States, 361 U.S. 39
(1959), the Attorney General argued, and the Court appeared to agree, that unless the
steelworkers' strike was enjoined, the national defense and space program would be
irreparably harmed by further delay. Id. at 41-42. In addition, the steel products
needed for these projects were not available from other sources. Id.
142. On the drift of Supreme Court equity opinions toward incoherence, see Professor Plater's critique of Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), appearing in
Plater, supra note 65, at 592-94, and this Article's critique of the doctrine evolving from
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), infra note 232 and accompanying text.
143. 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
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of the Labor Management Relations Act' 44 to secure an injunction
ordering a striking labor union back to work. The district court's decision to grant the injunction 145 was affirmed by the Third Circuit' 46
and the Supreme Court. 14 7 In their concurring opinion, Justice
Frankfurter and Justice Harlan observed that although a district
14 8
court sitting in equity must usually shape the details of a decree, it
was "not qualified to devise schemes for the conduct of an industry
so as to assure the securing of necessary defense materials.' 1 49 The
Justices stated that the injunction problem contained factors that the
trial court was not competent to judge, 5 0 and involved forces that the
court would be unable "to readjust or adequately to reweigh."''1
Therefore, the trial court was justified in issuing the injunction as
152
drafted by the Attorney General.
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan's opinion suggests that a federal
trial court need not understand the decree it issues, as long as the
injunction is supported by officials of the Executive Branch. 153 A federal judge who considers issuing an injunction under such circumstances faces one of two undesirable prospects. Either he relies on
the executive to tell him what to include in the injunction, what it
means, and when it has been violated, or he tries to discern for himself what the injunction means after he issues it. The first outcome is
an abdication of the federal judicial function.'5 The same considerations that prompt federal courts to rely on article III to deny themselves the power to adjudicate controversies in order to conserve that
power, 155 should lead the court to deny the injunction. The second
outcome is chaos. Adversaries will turn the Court one way and another as it grapples for answers in modification, clarification, or enforcement proceedings. So grave a manageability problem also raises
56
article I concerns.
Fortunately, the threat to the courts' discretion in shaping the public injunction suggested in the Justices' concurring opinion has not
materialized. 57 Nevertheless, every injunction, including those
144. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 208, 29 U.S.C. § 178 (1976).
145. United States V. United Steelworkers of Am., 178 F. Supp. 297, 301 (W.D. Pa.),
affd, 271 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), affd, 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
146. 271 F.2d 676 (3d Cir.), affd, 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
147. 361 U.S. at 44.
148. Id. at 50.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 51.
152. Id. at 55-58.
153. Id. at 50-51, 56-58.
154. See supra text accompanying note 126.
155. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
156. Functionally, article II "case" and "controversy" doctrines may be regarded as
a series of quality controls on the federal judicial product. Assuring quality is impossible unless federal courts have stable, judicially manageable working materials for
decision.
157. Instead, the cases establish that a trial court has considerable discretion in
handling questions of practicality in considering whether or how a decree should be
framed, as courts of equity would accomplish nothing by trying to order the impossible. See, e.g., TVA v. Tennesse Elec. Power Co., 90 F.2d 885, 894 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
301 U.S. 710 (1937); Moffitt v. City of Rock Island, 77 Ill.
App. 3d. 850, 854, 397 N.E.2d 457,
460 (1979).
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sought by law-enforcement agencies, has the potential to drain a
court's time and damage its stature. If an injunction is disobeyed,
these dangers are realized. In all cases, the courts must understand
the prospective decree well enough to conclude that there is a reasonable possibility for compliance. 15 8 Circumstances that support
this conclusion will vary from case to case, and courts must be permitted to retain the discretion to respond to each new situation.
Federal courts have lapsed into careless, sweeping language to
state the importance of statutorily based injunctions to the public interest. Some have gone so far as to suggest that the court's equitable
discretion is preempted. Few cases, however, have been resolved
under such an approach. 5 9 Closer examination reveals that the essentials of equitable restraint are rarely sacrificed in the face of the
so-called mandatory injunction. Judicial reservations concerning
substantiality, adequacy, and irreparability give way, as they should,
in the face of the special law-enforcement authority and needs of the
governmental plaintiff. Judicial reservations concerning imminence
and manageability, in contrast, do not. They must be addressed in
each case. There is a need for clearer, more closely reasoned opinions, but the results reached in the cases are on the whole
satisfactory.
B.

Equitable Jurisdiction Validly Exercised and Overturned: The
Doctrine of Younger v. Harris

In Younger v. Harris,160 the Supreme Court reviewed a three-judge
federal court's decision to enjoin the ongoing state criminal prosecution of federal plaintiff, Harris,' 6 ' under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act. 1 6 2 The district court held that the Act violated plaintiff's
158. See supra note 79 and accompanying text, see D. DOBBS, supra note 13, at 62-63.
159. Decisions based on a preemption idea were reversed in Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975), and Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
The statutorily mandated injunction has gained far greater acceptance in state practice. See, e.g., State ex. tel. Edmisten v. Challenge Inc., 54 N.C. App. 513, 522, 284 S.E.2d
333, 339 (1981); Rhode Island Turnpike Auth. v. Cohen, 433 A.2d 179, 182 n.5 (R.I. 1981).
But see Hudson v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 578 S.W.2d 301, 311-14 (Mo. App. 1979)
(courts should not issue "mandatory" injunction that would violate public-interest
concerns). State courts are not, of course, subject to article IlI constraints and are free
to take a different, more self-effacing view of their judicial independence. However,
because it is my view that the reasons for equitable restraint inhere in the judicial
process, state court acceptance of mandatory injunctions is also undesirable.
160. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
161. Other plaintiffs intervened and sought an injunction against Harris's prosecution, alleging that they felt "inhibited" by it. Id. at 39-40. The Court, citing Golden v.
Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969), responded that persons with only speculative fears of
prosecution could not invoke federal equitable power to enjoin a pending state proceeding. 401 U.S. at 42. The Court thereby equated a requirement of equitable jurisdiction with what, in Golden, was the requirement of a "controversy" under article III of
the Constitution. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. at 108-10. For further discussion of this
parallel, see supra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
162. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-02 (Deering 1980).
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first amendment rights. 163 The Supreme Court, apparently agreeing
with this conclusion, 164 nonetheless reversed. Writing for the Court,
Justice Black justified withdrawal of the injunction on equity doc166
trine, 165 with added references to comity and federalism.
Younger has since evolved into a broader doctrine barring plaintiffs
who use section 1983167 from seeking injunctions or declaratory judgments' 6 8 against pending state proceedings brought to enforce statutes or local ordinances, 169 at least when the pending state
163. Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 517 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
164. The Court observed that its earlier decision upholding the statute, Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), was overturned in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969). Younger, 401 U.S. at 4041. Interestingly enough, a California Court of Appeals
declared a section of the statute unconstitutional, in granting Daniel Harris's petition
for habeas corpus. In re Harris, 20 Cal. App. 3d 632, 634, 97 Cal. Rptr. 844, 845-46 (1971).
165. The Court invoked what it called "the basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence
that courts of equity should not act ... to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if
denied equitable relief." 401 U.S. at 43-44.
166. Justice Black loosely juxtaposed these concepts with equity doctrine on a page
of the opinion curiously devoid of citations. Id. at 44.
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981). Congress enacted § 1983 as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. An excellent review of the history of § 1983 appears in, Developments in the Law - § 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L.REV. 1133, 1137-75 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments - 1983 ]. For more recent developments, see generally,
Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundationsand an EmpiricalStudy, 67 CoRN.L.
REV. 482 (1982) (discussing the current weaknesses in § 1983 doctrine and the false
impressions the Supreme Court and many commentators share of § 1983 litigation
overloading federal courts), and Recent Developments in Reconstruction Era Civil
Rights Acts Litigation, 9 HASTnNGS CONST. L.Q. 459 (1982).
168. Declaratory judgments require an exercise of judicial discretion characteristically different from that required in injunction decision making. For an excellent discussion of the availability and applications of declaratory relief, see Developments in
the Law - Declaratory Judgments - 1941-49, 62 HARv. L. REV. 786 (1949). There is
widespread confusion over whether requests for declaratory judgments should be
tested by the same standards as injunctions, Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-74
(1971), or more freely granted, Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462-73 (1974), or less
freely granted, Public Serv. Comm. v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241-49 (1952). This subject is beyond the scope of this Article.
169. The doctrine has also been employed to support the refusal to enjoin "patterns
and practice of conduct in the administration of the criminal justice system" in an
Illinois County that allegedly violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 490 (1974).
Injunctions of the kind sought in O'Shea have been described as "structural." See 0.
liss, supra note 27, at 92-93. See generally Developments - 1983, supra note 167, at
1173-74, 1187-90 (discussing the structual injunction's implications for federal-state relations). Structural injunctions are sought to avert constitutional wrongs that are in
substantial part behavioral. The injunction granted may monitor or even reorder the
operation of state or local governments. In such cases, the inquiry does not tend to
focus on the validity of a state or local ordinance, nor is it likely that a state proceeding
will be pending. O'Shea, therefore, does not fit the paradigm outlined in the text accompanying this note.
Because the Younger doctrine addresses issues of equitable jurisdiction quite different from those presented by structural injunctions, the invocation of Younger by the
Court in O'Shea was inappropriate. The issue of irreparable harm is capable of posing
serious problems in some cases like Younger. See infra notes 181-87 and accompanying
text. In contrast, it is unclear whether any other judicial proceedings could repair the
harm the structural injunction would purportedly avert. Although recent studies offer
some hope, immunity doctrines may foreclose the availability of an alternative damage
action in federal or state court. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 241-43
(1981 Supp.); Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages
Against States in Their Own Courtsfor ConstitutionalViolations, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 189
(1981) (suggesting that the supremacy clause obligates state courts to ignore sovereign
immunity in some suits alleging violations of federal-constitutional rights); Note, Civil
Rights Suits Against State and Local Governmental Entities and Officials: Rights of
Action, Immunities, and Federalism, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 945 (1980); Note, Official Immu-
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proceeding is judicial in character. 170 The Supreme Court has applied
the Younger doctrine to deny injunctions sought against pending
state criminal proceedings,'17 1 and to overturn federal injunctions
172
rendered against state civil proceedings,
even those commenced in
73
state court by private parties.
Whether Justice Black intended to stray beyond the base of support provided by equity doctrine in withdrawing the injunction in
Younger is unclear. The cases he relied upon did not.17 4 And, late in
the opinion, he observed that "our holding rests on the absence of the
factors necessary under equitable principles to justify federal intervention ....
,,175 Nonetheless, Justice Black's opinion may be interpreted as a suggestion that policy arguments of comity and
nity in Federal Court. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc., 67 CORNELL L. REV. 188 (1981) (advocating a narrow reading of official immunity because of constitutional limits to judicial deference). The picture is much the
same concerning the availability of a civil rights injunction in state court. Cf.
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv.L. REV. 1105, 1124-27 (1977) (suggesting that
state court judges enforce constitutional rights less vigorously than federal court
judges). In addition, although concerns of manageability in shaping and administering
a decree in a suit to enjoin state proceedings are minimal, see infra notes 179-80 and
accompanying text, they can be of major concern when a structural injunction is
sought, see Altman, Implementing a Civil Rights Injunction: A Case Study of NAACP
v. Brennan, 78 COLUI. L. REV. 739, 740 (1978); Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditionsof
Prison Confinement: An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of
State PenalAdministration Under the EighthAmendmen4 29 STAN.L. REV. 893, 909-14
(1977); Developments - 1983, supra note 167, at 1231-50. For further discussion of manageability problems raised by structural injunctions, see infra note 180.
There have been few efforts like O'Shea to apply Younger in cases beyond the paradigm presented in the text surrounding this note. Even Professor Bator, who generally
approves of the results reached under the doctrine, is reluctant to extend the approach
of Younger to structural injunction cases. Bator, The State Courts and FederalConstitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & M RY L. REV. 605, 621, 635 (1981).
170. There is some confusion over whether Younger applies to nonjudicial proceedings. See, e.g., Williams v. Red Bank Bd. of Educ., 662 F.2d 1008, 1017 (3d Cir. 1981)
(applying Younger to an administrative proceeding); Reynolds v. City of Dayton, 533 F.
Supp. 136, 141-42 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (refusing to apply Younger to a nonjudicial proceeding); Pollard v. Panora, 411 F. Supp. 580, 588-89 (D. Mass. 1976) (same).
In an interesting recent case, the Supreme Court appeared to suggest that Younger
abstention is more appropriate when pending state proceedings are judicial. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden St. Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). Of course,
the line between judicial and nonjudicial proceedings is not a clear one. The Middlesex
County Court described disciplinary proceedings before a state bar association, under
the supervision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, as "judicial in nature." Id. at 433-34.
171. See, e.g., Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 131 (1975); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
82, 83-84 (1971).
172. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.
434, 443-44 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 607 (1975).
173. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 344 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. Justice Black cited Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Spielman Motor Sales
Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Watson
v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Williams v. Miller, 317 U.S. 599 (1942); and Douglas v. City
of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). Younger, 401 U.S. at 45-46.
Although there is room for controversy over how these cases should be read, see,
e.g., Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute: Part Two, 36 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 325-27 (1969); Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction,22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 683, 704 (1981), it is at least certain that none venture beyond doctrines of
equitable restraint.
175. 401 U.S. at 54.
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federalism can be allied with equity doctrine to build a stronger case
against injunctions. The Supreme Court soon acted upon that suggestion, characterizing the Younger doctrine as a tripartite inquiry prob1 76
ing semi-independent concerns of "equity, comity and federalism.'
The administration of the Younger doctrine is incompatible with
the goals of function and method advanced earlier in this Article as
part of the author's theory of equitable jurisdiction. Within the scope
of the Younger doctrine, proper administration of the requirements
of equitable jurisdiction should result in the issuance of injunctions
in some cases and their denial in others. Instead, the Supreme Court
negated federal equitable power in all cases within the ambit of the
doctrine. The post-Younger Supreme Court opinions suggest an inclination to void injunctions, not because the Court has satisfied itself
that the trial court's discretionary exercise of equitable jurisdiction is
unsound, but rather to advance public policy notions of comity and
federalism. 177 The Supreme Court has thereby obscured and denigrated the meaning of federal equity doctrine and overstepped its authority to refuse injunctions.
The traditional equitable-jurisdiction inquiry should be the sole
basis for evaluating requests to enjoin state proceedings. In cases
similar to Younger, federal courts must be free to conduct an imminence inquiry. The concerns reflected in this element of equitable jurisdiction 178 are no less present in this setting. In contrast, concerns
over manageability 79 are insignificant in the Younger context. The
decree sought is simply one to invalidate the state statute or local
ordinance. 180 The process of comprehension of and compliance with
such an injunction has an analog familiar in the experience of lawenforcement defendants: repeal of public laws by state or local legislative bodies.
The element of equitable jurisdiction, however, that has attracted
the most controversy in cases brought to enjoin state proceedings is
the irreparability-adequacy inquiry.' 8 1 Suggestions that these re176. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 602-03 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
177. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 426 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434,
446 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 601 (1975).
178. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. Concerns of imminence and substantiality are joined in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971), an analytic approach
characteristic of federal equitable jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying notes 6869.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
180. For surveys of federal decisions invalidating state statutes and local ordinances and enjoining their enforcement, see Isseks, Jurisdictionof the Lower Federal
Courts to Enjoin Unauthorized Action of State Offcials, 40 HARv.L. REv. 969 (1927),
and Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 Hnv. L. REV. 345 (1930).
The difficulties of management that Younger injunctions pose are slight When compared with those posed by federal law-enforcement injunctions, see supra notes 153-58
and accompanying text, and with those posed by structural civil rights injunctions, see
Leubsdorf, supra note 47, at 138. The problems that Professor Leubsdorf so vividly
describes are not insurmountable. For an intelligent and statesman-like judicial response, see Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 532-35 (lst Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1042 (1977).
181. See 0. Finss, supra note 27, at 42. The greatest criticism of contemporary rules
of equitable jurisdiction is generally reserved for the irreparability-adequacy requirement. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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82
quirements be suspended in cases like Younger are unjustified.1
The irreparability inquiry is a necessary one in a suit brought to enjoin a state law-enforcement proceeding, which represents the allocation of presumably scarce public law-enforcement resources.
Although interrupting the state proceeding does not present a separation-of-powers issue,18 3 the separation-of-powers dimension of the
84
federal courts' relationship to federal law-enforcement officers1
should increase the courts' sensitivity to planning and resource-allocation problems in law enforcement facing state and local officials as
well.1 85 The federal suit duplicates1 8 6 and casts aspersions upon the
official's work, subjecting him to the strain of being a defendant and
potential addressee of the court's injunction. 87 Although injunctions
in such cases may be easy to frame, the federal court will frequently

182. The hierarchical subordination of the injunction is most evident in the
irreparability-adequacy inquiry. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. Critics
find this subordination particularly distasteful when it leads to the denial of a civil
rights injunction. Professor Fiss writes: "My conceptual world has been shaped in
large part by the civil rights experience, and at the core of that experience is a concep-

tion of rights that denies their reducibility to a series of propositions assuring the payment of money to the victims." 0. Fiss, supra note 27, at 75; see also Rendleman, supra
note 27, at 352 (criticizing the notion that constitutional violations may be redressed
adequately by monetary payments).

In the Younger setting, however, it is neither appropriate nor necessary to regard
the civil rights plaintiff as having another remedy - for damages or otherwise - in
order to refuse the injunction. Plaintiff's involuntary status as a state criminal or civil
defendant may offer a means of raising the same constitutional issue, but hardly suggests a remedy. See supra notes 74-78 and surrounding text. But, insofar as the state
court is required to entertain the constitutional issue as a defense, the irreparability
requirement makes the need to visualize an alternative remedy unnecessary. Id. In
addition, although it may be especially painful to do so, courts must apply principles of
equitable restraint in constitutional cases as in all others. See Developments - Injunctions, supra note 10, at 1007; cf. Henkin, Is There a PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 85 Yale
L.J. 597, 621-22 (1976) (suggesting that ordinary principles of equitable restraint would
better explain the Supreme Court's reluctance to decide certain questions than the
"political question" doctrine). My reason for reaching this conclusion follows from this
Article's theory of equitable jurisdiction, see supra notes 52-80, which asserts that the
limits of equitable restraint inhere in the judicial process.
183. Contra Nagel, Separationof Powersand the Scope of FederalEquitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 661-65 (1978).
184. See supra notes 131-35.
185. For a discussion of some of the problems created by federal court interference,
see ALI STUDY, supra note 73, at 282; Warren, supra note 180, at 373-76; Simpson, supra
note 33, at 242-46.
186. In the Younger setting, the state suit is usually pending when the federal suit
is filed. But see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349-50 (1975) (federal plaintiff filed federal complaint before state criminal proceedings were begun, but Court applied
Younger because the state criminal proceedings began before any proceedings on the
merits of the federal claim). So long as the civil rights claimant can raise the same
issue as a defense in a state proceeding, he is assured of a forum for the claim. The
supremacy clause guarantees that the state court cannot impose liability without con-

sidering a constitutional defense. See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN
THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 124 (1980). The federal proceeding in this sense
duplicates a prospective function of the state proceeding and may involve some waste
of the prosecutor's time.
187. It seems more awkward to subject state and local law-enforcement officials,
rather than private defendants, to these strains.
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appear to be questioning state or local officials' good faith and legal
competence.
Whether these costs should be borne depends in part on a determination of the situation that the federal plaintiff will confront if the
injunction is withheld. The harm plaintiff seeks to avert is the alleged
encroachment of the statute or ordinance on his constitutional rights.
If plaintiff could avert this harm through another procedure, the
court should refuse to issue the injunction. 188 In addition, the federal
court should analyze the relative importance of the defendant's lawenforcement interests. State criminal proceedings probably are entitled to greater deference than state civil proceedings. 189 But if the
188. The inquiry should be twofold. First, the promptness and certainty of a state
decision should be ascertained by examining the posture of the state case and the
nature of governing state-procedural law. For example, the state-procedural frustrations facing the federal plaintiffs that were revealed in dissenting opinions in several of
the cases should have been addressed by the majority. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 43742 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (federal plaintiffs lost custody of their children for
over one month because of inadequate notice and hearing provisions of state statutory
scheme); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 434, 451-52 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(state court granted a continuance on the validity of the attachment of federal plaintiffs' property, depriving them of their savings for additional two weeks; state court
also never acted on plaintiff's motion to temporarily enjoin execution of attachment);
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 60, 65 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (state trial and
appellate courts denied federal plaintiff's requests to prohibit prosecution under an
unconstitutional statute). Second, results of the inquiry should vary according to the
constitutional rights claimed. The first amendment appears to retain its special importance. Cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (even a brief loss
of first amendment freedoms constitutes irreparable injury). Yet Younger appears to
renounce the implication of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), that a state
prosecution may destroy perishable first amendment rights prior to the adjudication of
the constitutional issue, even in the absence of bad faith prosecution. The idea of valuing some civil rights above others may be disquieting, but rough justice is better than
no justice at all. Consider Judge Friendly's view: "I would be considerably more willing
to abstain in a case . . . where the issue was the permissible length of hair of high
school students than when it concerned the rights of black citizens to equal education,
housing or employment opportunity." H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL
VIEW 95 (1973) (footnote omitted).
One step removed are those cases in which no state proceeding is pending when the
federal case is filed. Plaintiffs in such cases may fall prey to imminence or article III
problems, see supra note 161, but are safe from the Younger doctrine, see Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711 (1977); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1974). But
see M. REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 691 (1983). Some
commentators have suggested that too much depends on whether the state proceeding
is actually begun first. H. FRIENDLY, supra, at 97; Bator, supra note 169, at 616-17 n.35. If,
however, the distinction should be "between cases in which the plaintiff seeks an anticipatory ruling that future conduct is constitutionally immune from state punishment (or other regulation), and cases in which the plaintiff is claiming that past
conduct is so immune," id. at 617 n.35, then the present rule appears to work pretty
well. In the only case in which the federal plaintiff managed to file first but sought to
insulate past conduct from state criminal prosecution, the Court applied the Younger
doctrine anyway. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-50 (1975).
189. The Supreme Court did not apply the Younger doctrine to dismiss a plaintiff
seeking an injunction against pending state civil proceedings until Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In its subsequent decisions, the Court has failed to find a
pending state civil proceeding so inconsequential as not to be entitled to the protection
of the Younger doctrine. The Court is usually careful to analogize the state regulatory
interest at stake in the state civil case to some aspect of the state's criminal law. See,
e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 60405 (1975). However, because state interests in regulating behavior through enforcement of civil and criminal laws are naturally akin, it is hard to escape the conclusion
that the Younger doctrine now bars injuctions against all criminal and civil state judicial proceedings.
It is regrettable that the Supreme Court has taken this position. As the Court's approach by analogy seems to concede, the need to preserve civil aspects of state and
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federal plaintiff extensively used the state civil court system prior to
filing his federal case, he may be more vulnerable to the adequacy
requirement in seeking the injunction. 190 Finally, Younger should be
applied less willingly if the plaintiff in the state proceeding is a private individual rather than a public law-enforcement officer.' 9 '
The Supreme Court has selected as vehicles for elaborating the
Younger doctrine primarily those cases in which federal trial courts
have granted injunctions sought against state judicial proceedings as
within the sound exercise of their equitable jurisdiction. 192 Before
considering whether these decisions give proper regard to the dynamics of equitable jurisdiction, it is important to consider a more
fundamental question. Given the fact-centered' 93 and historically
discretionary 9 4 nature of equity decision making, how much justification is there for reviewing these decisions at all? Although federal
law on the reviewability of exercises of equitable discretion is not
settled, 95 the answer should be that review may be justified so long
as the precedential effect of appellate redecision is limited.
The results of federal appellate review of exercises of equitable jurisdiction are inherently confined. Of the two functions of appellate
review - administration of a rule of law and securing justice in the
given case 196 - only the latter is advanced. This is because the faclocal law enforcement from federal interference is not as immediate. The Court's refusal to apply this distinction robs the Younger doctrine of any sensitivity.
190. Ordinarily, it would be unfair to regard the federal plaintiff as having acquired,
through the added jural identity of a state defendant, an adequate remedy at law. See
supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. The more extensively he partakes in the
state proceeding, however, the less coerced the idea of a state remedy seems. The extreme case would be one in which the state defendant litigated the constitutional issue, lost, then filed in federal court to enjoin the proceeding before the state judgment
became final.
191. The doctrine was extended to such a case in Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
Juidice is one of the most disturbing of the Younger line of cases. If the doctrine is to
be applied at all in civil proceedings, the status of the state plaintiff as a private individual should make it far harder to refuse the federal injunction. Under such circumstances the burden of justification created by disruption of a regime of public law
enforcement, see supra text accompanying notes 183-87, would not seem, absent a special showing, to be present. For a case in which the Supreme Court appears more perceptive to the differences between public and private law enforcement, see Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
192. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 422 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S.
434, 438-39 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,
340-42 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 599 (1975). To a far lesser extent,
the Supreme Court has elaborated Younger through affirming injunction denials. See,
e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68 (1971).
193. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
195. Compare the assertions that the trial court's exercise of equitable discretion is
or should be insulated to a substantial extent from appellate review in Doran v. Salem
Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931-32 (1975); Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 457 (1973); William
Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. rr Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1975);
and Note, supra note 99, at 1033-34 n.44, with arguments to the contrary in Developments - Injunctions,supra note 10, at 1070, and ALI STU=y, supra note 73, at 206.
196. I have discussed the foundations of these two functions in Shreve, supra note
85, at 921-23. Professor Cover has perhaps made a similar distinction with the terms
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19 7
tors relevant to an equitable-jurisdiction inquiry are so variable
198
that decisions posed for courts are rule-resistant.
Appellate redecision of an injunction question should influence the
trial court's consideration of the next case only by example. Supreme
Court decisions elaborating rules of equitable jurisdiction can design
and, if necessary, enforce a methodology to guide equitable discretion. 199 The Court can order federal trial judges to consider the potentially strong public interest in the attempts to enforce state and local
laws, and whether plaintiff's request to interrupt that enforcement is
justified. But whether a court should issue an injunction depends on
how elements of equitable jurisdiction register and combine in each
case.
Because they should be entitled to so little precedential value and
because federal circuit 2 ° and Supreme Court 20 1 resources are exceedingly scarce, appellate redecisions of incidents of judical discretion are generally difficult to justify. It is hard to argue, however, that
decisions of equitable jurisdiction in cases like Younger should not
be open to review. 2° 2 Public interests likely to repose in the federal
court defendants in such cases 20 3 might justify reenacting the equitable-jurisdiction inquiry simply to assure that justice is done 20 4 in the
case. 20 5 The problem is that appellate judges usually speak in terms
of rules, just as those who read their opinions usually search for the
ratio decidendi.206 Courts have expressed concern over the devitaliz-

"norm articulation" and "dispute resolution." Cover, The Uses of JurisdictionalRedundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L, REV. 639, 643-46 (1981).
197. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text. Designation of the trial court's
decision about equitable jurisdiction as discretionary should be understood, in part, as
a product of this realization. See supra notes 14, 48, 121, and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 52-80 and accompanying text.
200. Docket overcrowding in the federal circuits has been a serious problem for
some time. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 188, at 31-33; P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO,
H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 5556, 1572-74 (2d ed. 1973 & 1981 Supp.). See generally Carrington,Crowded Dockets and
the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to The Function of Review and the NationalLaw, 82
HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969); Meador, Appellate Case Management and Decisional
Processes, 61 VA. L. REV. 255 (1975); Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in
JudicialAdministration, 42 TEx. L. REV. 949 (1964).
201. In contrast to the federal circuit courts, the Supreme Court has managed to
keep its workload current. R. STERN & E. GREssmAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 43 (5th
ed. 1978). The Court, however, does not necessarily have the time to work through its
docket without truncating the process of decision in some cases and evading decision
in others. See generally Griswold, Rationing Justice - The Supreme Court's Caseload
and What the CourtDoes Not Do, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (1975); Harper & Etherington,
What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1950 Term, 100 U. PA. L, REV. 354
(1951); Harper & Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term -An
Appraisal of Certiorari,99 U. PA. L. REV. 293 (1950); Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958
Term - Foreward:The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L REV. 84 (1959).
202. For example, as I have undertaken to explain elsewhere, all federal court decisions denying intervention should be regarded as discretionary and rarely subject to
appellate redecision. Shreve, supra note 85, at 924.
203. See supra text accompanying note 185.
204. Assuming, of course, that no rule of law can be administered.
205. Cf. McClintock, supra note 14, at 51 n.16 ("Equitable discretion is subject to
review on appeal, since it is the duty of the reviewing court to render the decree which
the trial court ought to have rendered.").
206. See R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 56-57 (rev. ed.
1954); Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion of the Trial Cour Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 643 (1971).
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ing effect of precedent
on the chancellor's discretion throughout eq20 7
uity's history.
The Supreme Court's willingness to serve as ultimate chancellor
may explain the brittleness of the Younger doctrine. It cannot, however, explain the breadth of that decision's subsequent construction.
The Younger doctrine nearly imposes an absolute rule barring federal injunctions against pending state enforcement proceedings if the
federal plaintiff alleges that the law to be enforced is unconstitutional.20 8 If it were possible to conclude that issuing injunctions in
such cases could never be supportable as a sound exercise of the trial
court's equitable discretion, the rule could be defended in the name
of efficiency. Because this is not true,20 9 however, the rule is insupportable on equity grounds alone. The Supreme Court, however, has
made Younger more than a rule of equity. In its broad sweep and
inflexible form, the Younger doctrine operates much more akin to a
2 10
federal subject-matter jurisdiction statute.
The functional resemblance of the Younger doctrine to a jurisdictional rule becomes especially clear given the example provided by
the Anti-Injunction Act,21 1 a jurisdictional statute 2 12 presently in
207. See supra note 14.
208. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text. The Younger Court itself identified two exceptions to the rule it established. If the district court finds that the state
prosecution is being conducted in bad faith, or is motivated by a desire to harass the
defendant, the court may enjoin the proceeding. 401 U.S. 37, 47-49 (1971). In addition, if
the challenged statute is patently and flagrantly unconstitutional, an injunction would
be warranted. Id. at 53-54.
The number of exceptions has not grown and the two described above have largely
proven to be illusory. The only clear illustration of the first exception is the retrospective example made of Dombrowsli v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), in Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 47-51 (1971). The passage making up the second exception is language
quoted in Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54, from Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941). The
tortured language of this exception is not clarified by reading Watson, and the
Supreme Court has yet to invoke it in lieu of applying the Younger doctrine.
209. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
210. Regulating subject-matter jurisdiction by reference to the remedy sought is a
well-established draftsman's technique. See statutes discussed infra note 212. The device works reasonably well, at least when compared to the complexities of determining
subject-matter jurisdiction in federal question cases utilizing the "arising under" language of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). See ALI STuDY, supra note 73, at 189; Note, The Expanded Federal Question" On the Independent Viability of Declaratory Claims, 57
NOTRE DAME LAW. 806, 811-813 (1982). See generally Mishkin, The Federal"Question" in
the District Courts, 53 COLum. L. REV. 157 (1953) (arguing for a broad construction of
the "arising under" language if Congress has articulated a federal policy in a substantive area). Because federal plaintiffs must identify remedies sought in their complaint,
a remedy-based regulating factor permits federal trial judges to screen cases early,
either on defendant's motion to dismiss, or sua sponte.
211. Orginally enacted in 1793, it now appears in revised form at 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1976): "A court of the United States may not grant an injuction to stay proceedings in
a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment." On the history of the
Anti-Injunction Act and developments in § 2283 litigation, see M. REDISH, supra note
186, at 259-90, and Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78
COLUm. L. REV. 330 (1978).
212. It may seem more natural to describe affirmative grants of federal judicial
power as jurisdiction statutes. In light of article III's language and history, see infra
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force. The statute appears to traverse the same ground as the
Younger doctrine in much the same way.2 1 3 Indeed, the Younger doctrine would have been rendered all but unnecessary 2 14 had the Court
215
not declared the Act inapplicable to section 1983 actions.
The Supreme Court justifies its ersatz rule of federal subject-matter jurisdiction on public-interest concerns of comity and federalism.
A closer examination of the two concerns, however, reveals that
neither adds to the courts' authority to deny injunctions.
Comity 2 16 concerns supporting a federal forum's refusal to entertain a case should have already been fully considered under a properly conducted equitable-jurisdiction inquiry. Recent decisions
invoking comity appear to proceed from the supposition that concurrent federal and state proceedings are largely duplicative. 2 17 If the
note 224, to suggest the Congress was empowered only to add to the jurisdictional
power of lower federal courts is unthinkable. The valid exercise of Congressional
power to remove cases from the authority of United States district courts is also a
regulation of jurisdiction. For example, the Tax-Injuction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976),
which restricts federal injunctions against state tax collection, and the Johnson Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1342 (1976), which restricts federal injunctions against state and local utility
regulation, have been analogized to jurisdictional statutes. HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 9, at 976, 978; cf Frankfurter, Distributionof JudicialPowerBetween United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 507-11 (1928) (describing statutory developments in the history of federal-question jurisdiction that both expanded and restricted
federal judicial authority). The Anti-Injunction Act is also, in effect, jurisdictional. Cf.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281, 294 (1970)
("A federal court does not have inherent power to ignore the limitations of § 2283 and
to enjoin state court proceedings merely because those proceedings interfere with a
protected federal right or invade an area preempted by federal law, even when the
interference is unmistakably clear.").
Congress's authority to withdraw federal court power to issue injunctions is beyond
question. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943); Lauf v. E.G. Shinner &
Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938). But absent congressional exercise of this authority, federal
courts retain their power to issue injunctions in suits over which they have jurisdiction. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 705 (1979); see also Porter v. Warner Holding
Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (federal courts retain all equitable powers unless Congress
decrees otherwise).
213. Compare the language of the statute, supra note 211, with the text accompanying notes 167-70.
214. Of the post-Younger cases, only Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 322 (1975), would
have escaped the same result under the Anti-Injunction Act. For a discussion of Hicks,
see supra note 186.
215. In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Court held that § 1983 suits operated as exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act since they were, in the language of the
Act, "expressly authorized by Act of Congress." Id. at 242. Because the statute appears
neither expressly nor implicitly to exempt litigation brought under it from the AntiInjunction Act, the result in Mitchum was curious. Professor Redish, who liked the
result, nonetheless described the opinion as "questionable in its legal reasoning." M.
REDISH, supra note 186, at 271. Judge Friendly, who did not, called it "devastating to
proper federal-state relations." H. FRIENDLY, supra note 188, at 99.
216. The term is of uncertain meaning at best. It particularly suffers from the lack of
a satisfactory definition in the Younger line of cases. Federal courts have construed
comity as a reason to decline jurisdiction to avoid duplicating state proceedings. But
federal courts have usually been able to exercise their jurisdiction notwithstanding
duplicative state proceedings, so long as the rival state action was not in rem. E.g.,
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 230 (1922). Although comity connotes deferral
"[w]hen the degree of deference is relatively weak," Neuborne, Toward Procedural
Parityin ConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 725, 767 (1981), the present
trend appears to be toward an increased use of comity dismissals; see infra note 217.
217. See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 106, 116
(1981); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 665 (1978); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1976). See generally Note, Stays of
Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently Pending State Court Suits, 60
COLUM. L. REv. 684 (1960); Note, Problems of ParallelState and FederalRemedies, 71
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defendant in a suit to enjoin a state prosecution demonstrates a sufficient parallel between the federal case and the pending state proceedings to justify a comity-based dismissal, he has demonstrated, a
fortiori,that the federal plaintiff has failed what should be the irreparability-adequacy requirement of federal equitable jurisdiction. 218
However viable the comity issue may be in other settings, 219 it is redundant in cases addressed by the Younger doctrine.
In one respect, the appeal to federalism is also an inconsequential
argument. Federal defendants can argue that not only are their attempts at law enforcement disrupted, but the competence and integrity of state judges will be impugned by a federal injunction. But, in
comparison to arguments of defendants' own interests, appeals to the
latter are likely to be diffuse and attenuated. They suffer from
problems of obscurity characteristic of the arguments of injunction
litigants who attempt to affiliate themselves with the interests 2of
21
third parties, 220 and thus should not be afforded much weight.
Thus, federalism, like comity, adds little to the federal defendants'
arguments concerning equitable jurisdiction.
On the other hand, federalism as a supplementary reason for injunction deferral frees the Younger doctrine from the constraints of a
properly conducted equitable-jurisdiction inquiry. Much of the justification given by the Court 222 pnd sympathetic commentators 223 for
the doctrine is that it regulates traffic between state and federal
courts in a way that best advances the interests of federalism.
This argument, however, proves too much. Issues of federalism are
of such transcendent importance that the Constitution mandates that
inquiry over proportionate allocation of power between state and fedL. REV. 513 (1958); Note, Power to Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Litigation, 59 YALE .J. 978 (1950).
218. My suggestions for the form of the irreparability-adequacy requirement are
discussed supra notes 70-78, 136-42, and accompanying text.
As a more basic matter, Younger-type cases simply do not pose the prospect of a
parallel state proceeding because the federal plaintiff is cast in the role of a state defendant. This distinction is potentially very important. See the factors reviewed supra
notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
219. The soundness of the Supreme Court's recent comity decisions, see cases cited
supra note 217, has not escaped question, see HART & WEcnsLER, supra note 9, at 31315 (Supp. 1981); Currie, The Supreme Court and FederalJurisdiction:1975 Term, 1976
SuP. CT. REV. 183, 213-15 (1976).
220. See supra note 97.
221. As Professor Fiss correctly observes: "the primary concern must be With the
sensibilities of state prosecutors; they would be the addressees of the... injunction. It
is truly difficult, though not impossible, to imagine a state judge noticing - much less
taking offense - when a case ceases to appear on his ever-crowded calendar." 0. FIss,
supra note 27, at 64.
222. See, e.g., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1979); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431
U.S. 434, 442-43 (1977); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609 (1975).
223. See Aldisert, On Being Civil to Younger, 11 CONN. L. REV. 181, 195 (1979); cf.
Bator, supra note 169, at 621-25 (declining to endorse the precise lines of Younger, but
approving of the case generally because of the role it will preserve for state judges in
constitutional adjudication).
HARV.
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eral courts be perennial. But the power to conduct the inquiry2 24 and
the processes suitable to its undertaking 225 belong to Congress, not
the federal judiciary. Whether the Supreme Court could have
achieved the Younger doctrine's effect more legitimately through
226
statutory interpretation is an interesting, but academic question.
224. The prospect of rivalry between lower federal courts and state courts was a
concern raised at the Constitutional Convention. The framers agreed upon the need
for a national judiciary, but many feared that federal trial courts would encroach upon
the individual states' rights. State courts were considered perfectly competent to hear
all cases, assuming a right of appeal to a federal supreme court. M. FARRAND, THE
FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNTrED STATES 79-80 (1913).
At the convention, creation of a lower federal judiciary along with a supreme court
was approved as the ninth resolution of the Virginia Plan. 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 8,
at 21-22. Later, the Convention voted to strike the language creating "inferior tribunals" in the ninth resolution. Id. at 118. In the next vote to be taken, the Convention
added to the ninth resolution: 'That the national legislature be empowered to appoint
inferior Tribunals." Id. Delegates Madison and Wilson had argued unsuccessfully
against the vote to strike "inferior tribunals." After that vote, they argued in favor of
the substitute language of the passage that the Convention had just stricken, observing the distinction between establishing such tribunals in the Constitution and giving
the legislature the discretion to establish them. Id. at 125. The history, then, as well as
the language of article III indicates that concerns of federalism in the allocation of
judicial power were committed to Congress.
Congress has since willingly made jurisdictional adjustments in the name of federalism. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 9, at 967-68 (discussing the history of the
three-judge requirement in federal district court, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281-2282 (repealed
1976)); see also supra note 212. Congress has also considered reducing civil rights jurisdiction in the name of federalism. For a discussion of such legislation considered in the
97th Congress, see Shreve, Federal Jurisdiction:The Perils and Rewards of Pulling
Things Together (Book Review), 80 MICH. L. REV. 688, 693-94 & nn.28-330 (1982). See
generally, Bator, CongressionalPower Over the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 27
VrLL. L. REv. 1030 (1982); Sager, The Supreme Court- 1980 Term - ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95
HARv. L. REV. 17 (1981).
225. Questions about the extent of lower federal court jurisdiction are essentially
political and are best addressed by the institution most comfortable with the political
side of law making: Congress. Consider the following classic observations on the legal
process of jurisdictional law-making.
Not inherent reasons ... but practical justifications explain the past judiciary acts and must vindicate existing jurisdiction. The force and dangers of
parochial attachments, the effectiveness and limitations of a centralized judiciary administering law over a continent, the dependability of state
courts, the convenience of suitors, shifting economic and political sentiments - such influences, with varying incidence, have shaped the accommodations of authority distributed between the national judiciary and the
state courts. The present jurisdiction cannot rely on tradition.
Frankfurter, supra note 212, at 514. Then Professor Frankfurter correctly concluded
that questions of federal jurisdictional limits
are issues of the very stuff of American politics, to be settled or evaded by
the compromises of one generation, only to reappear in the next. They are
not technical issues, nor within the special province of lawyers. The formulation of the compromises demand legal skill, and of a high order. But the
bases of adjustment must be evolved by statesmen, and ought both to enlist
and to satisfy public understanding.
Id. at 500-01.
226. The Supreme Court declined an opportunity presented in Mitchum v. Foster,
407 U.S. 225 (1972), to interpret the Anti-Injunction Act so as to obviate the need to
resort to the Younger doctrine in most cases, by construing § 1983 to be an "expressly
authorized" exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
The result in Mitchum is open to question. There is much to the view that "the 'expressly authorized' condition of the statute cannot simply be ignored." Mayton, supra
note 211, at 355. Critics of the Mitchum decision appear to be correct in arguing that the
condition was ignored in that case. It may not be altogether fair to criticize the Mitchum Court's failure to choose correctly between the avenues presented by the AntiInjunction Act and the Younger doctrine, as the latter choice may have not then been
available. The pending state proceeding was civil in character and perhaps the Court
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By instead setting up what is in effect a rival scheme of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court has caused several problems.
First, statutory jurisdiction confers an entitlement to sue in federal
court.227 Whether the federal plaintiff is damaged when a court
utilizes Younger to withdraw that entitlement depends on whether a
state court adjudication would be in all respects as satisfactory as
one by a federal trial judge.228 It is doubtful that in all respects it
would. 229 Second, it is wrong to deprive a federal plaintiff of an inwas not ready to apply Younger to civil proceedings. Still, if the Supreme Court was
determined to strike jurisdictional balances in the name of federalism, it is regrettable
that it did not choose the Anti-Injunction Act as a vehicle, since the invocation of federalism would not have been out of place there. The implications of the choice made by
the Court are more than academic. See infra notes 227-32.
There is general agreement that the Anti-Injunction Act's original purpose has become obscure. The conventional view as to its purpose is reflected in Justice Black's
opinion for the Court in Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs,
398 U.S. 281 (1970): "While all the reasons that led Congress to adopt this restriction on
federal courts are not wholly clear, it is certainly likely that one reason stemmed from
the essentially federal nature of our national government." Id. at 285 (footnote omitted); see also Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 518-19
(1955) (section 2283 reflects Congress's confidence in the state courts' ability to vindicate federal rights, and a desire to avoid conflicts between federal and state courts).
Justice Black's view, supported in the past, see Warren, supra note 180, at 347-48, has
come under recent criticism. See Mayton, supra note 211, at 331-346 (Congress intended only to prohibit individual Supreme Court Justicies from enjoining a state proceeding); Note, Federal Court Stay of State Court Proceedings:A Re-examination of
OriginalCongressionalIntent, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 612, 613-14, 618 (1971) (asserting that
historical evidence shows that Congress intended that the federal courts be permitted
to use other methods of interfering in state proceedings). Yet, in light of the Anti-Injunction Act's language, and Congress's attempts to implement policies of federalism
through jurisdictional enactments, it seems clear that judicial interpretation of the
Anti-Injunction Act would have provided stronger support for a door-closing rule than
equity doctrine larded with public-interest concerns of comity and federalism. The
concerns of comity and federalism have, in fact, been invoked as factors in the interpretation of a jurisdictional statute. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
503-05 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's use of comity and federalism was far more appropriate to the issue there, the scope of the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction over state decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976), than was his
use of the same formualtion when writing for the Court in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975), and Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
227. It is in the national interest for certain federal-question jurisdiction to exist in
United States district courts: suits brought by the federal government and those in
which the United States or one of its officers is a party. ALI STUDY, supra note 73, at
477. The remainder of federal-question jurisdiction appears intended "to provide a federal forum to those litigants who prefer it in federal question cases." Id.
On occasion the Supreme Court has recognized the status of federal jurisdiction as a
party entitlement. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411, 415 (1964); see also Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1982) (federal courts should not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under federal statutes unless
deferral is consistent with congressional intent). The Younger doctrine, of course, does
not recognize the party-entitlement idea of federal jurisdiction, nor do other recent
Supreme Court cases declining jurisdiction in the name of comity. See supra note 217.
228. Compare Neuborne, supra note 169 (institutional differences between state
and federal courts make the federal courts the preferred forum) with Fischer, Institutional Competency: Some Reflections on JudicialActivism In the Realm of Forum Allocation Between State and Federal Courts, 34 U. Mmmi. L REV. 175 (1980) (criticizing
Professor Neuborne's belief that institutional differences between state and federal
courts are in fact clearly measurable).
229. In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), Justice Rehnquist tried to
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junction awarded after a thorough inquiry under doctrines of equitable jurisdiction, for no better reason than that it is in the public
interests of comity and federalism to do so. The Younger doctrine
does considerable violence to the idea suggested earlier in this Article 230 that, properly understood and applied, equitable jurisdiction is
capable of justifying as well as refusing injunctions. 23 1 If the
Supreme Court uses Younger to overturn an injunction issued within
the lower court's equitable jurisdiction, it denies the injunction to
one imminently threatened with the substantial loss of constitutional
rights, who is without the prospect of an adequate noninjunctive remedy or any practical hope that injury to those rights will otherwise be
averted. A properly understood equitable-jurisdiction inquiry does
not under such circumstances leave plaintiff's case untested. It validates plaintiff's request for an injunction and creates a strong presumption that it should issue. Appeals to comity and federalism
should be ineffective in the face of this presumption.
A final problem created by the Younger doctrine is that it contributes to an already confused and unattractive image of equity.23 2 The
only way for courts to administer federal equitable jurisdiction in
Younger or other settings is through an appreciation of the factsensitive and exceedingly variable inquiry from case to case. This
soften the Younger doctrine's impact by pointing out that the constitutional claimant
could seek review of his case in a federal appellate forum under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2)
(1976). Id. at 605. However, a federal appellate forum is an inadequate substitute for a
federal trial forum. "A federal trial court with authority to hear evidence, decide facts,
and issue injunctions is armed with a powerful device, one far more potent than U.S.
Supreme Court review of a final state supreme court judgement." Meador, Lecture
Before the National College of the State Judiciary, reprinted in 6E CONGRESS AND THE
CouRTs: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1787-1977, at 798-799 (B. Reams and C. Haworth eds.
1976-78); see also Currie, supra note 219, at 211 (the Supreme Court cannot independently determine facts on appeal, and often denies certiorari); Wechsler, supra note
73, at 218 (initial state court adjudication tends to give states the final voice on federal
questions because Supreme Court review can never function on a quantitative basis).
Nonetheless, even those who argue that federal courts are preferable to state courts
acknowledge the lack of hard evidence to support the conclusion that federal judges
tend to be more sympathetic to constitutional claimants. See M. REDISH, supra note
186, at 3; Neuborne, supra note 216, at 726. Empirical data, however, does not provide
the only path to understanding what makes federal judges preferable in such cases.
The constitutional questions raised in cases like Younger will often be close and
difficult. There will be no obvious answer and an answer can be reached only by sacrificing some desirable ends in favor of others. Under such circumstances, much may
depend on the judge's orientation when the inquiry begins. The state judge will wonder why state law, which he constantly lives with and enforces in other cases, should
be disregarded in this case. The federal judge, though accustomed to enforcing state
law in diversity cases, will not regard himself as a living extension of state law, as may
his state court counterpart. For a related discussion of how judicial practice and custom influence the analytic starting point in an analogous setting, see Shreve, supra
note 86, at 345.
230. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
231. The Supreme Court's principal mode of elaborating the Younger doctrine has
been to overturn injunctions on review. See cases cited supra note 192. It is not clear
that, as a matter of federal equitable jurisdiction, all of those injunctions should have
been granted originally. What can be said is that those injunctions should have been
overturned only in cases in which the Court demonstrated in thoughtful, closely reasoned opinions that the restraints of equitable jurisdiction were exceeded.
232. Younger and related cases are "Exhibit A" in Professor Fiss's case against the
hierarchical subordination of injunctions. 0. Fiss,supra note 27, at 42, 62-65. An indication of the confusion Younger has generated can be found in Professor Laycock's opposing view that the Younger cases have little to do with equity. Laycock, supra note
27, at 1069.
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does not pose an easy alternative to Younger. But it may be easier to
live with, for it does not ask the impossible: to create wooden rules
out of the protean material of equity.

Conclusion
Although the attack on equitable jurisdiction's creation of a hierarchy of remedies has intensified in recent years, the long-standing
rules restricting the exercise of equitable discretion should not be
ignored. As described in the author's theory of equitable jurisdiction,
the requirements of imminent, substantial, and irreparable harm, no
adequate remedy at law, and manageability are capable of serving
important functions in limiting the issuance of injunctions, which, in
turn, reduces the strains on courts and defendants that are often created by these injunctions.
Those who assert that federal courts should ignore some of the
traditional restraints of equity jurisdiction in issuing injunctions
sought by governmental plaintiffs do not appreciate the utility of
each restraint. For a court to issue an injunction without finding the
probability of imminent harm is wasteful of scarce judicial resources.
Similarly, concerns of manageability are particularly important in
public-injunction cases, as it is the issuing court that must ultimately
determine whether the injunction has been violated. Public-interest
concerns can be accommodated through the traditional inquiries of
equitable jurisdiction. Although it does not appear that the federal
courts have abandoned their judicial function in public injunction
cases, courts should more clearly address these factors in each case.
More troubling, however, is the federal courts' decision to forego
the equitable-jurisdiction inquiry when faced with comity and federalism arguments by state governmental plaintiffs. As a result of the
Younger doctrine, considerations of comity and federalism now operate to prevent absolutely the federal courts' exercise of equitable jurisdiction in certain situations, thereby replacing the sensitivity that
could be displayed by courts analyzing these cases under the instrumental view of equity principles suggested by the author's theory of
equitable jurisdiction. Moreover, it is Congress's responsibility, not
the federal courts', to regulate the flow of cases between federal and
state courts according to the dictates of federalism.
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